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Introduction
An investment decision involves a commitment today, with a return from this commitment
at some later date. This return is often uncertain at the time the investment decision is
made. When evaluating such investment opportunities, a decision maker therefore needs
to make a prediction about the relative likelihood of the different future possible outcomes.
Muth (1961) revolutionized how economists view the expectations that inform invest-
ment decisions. Individual investors might disagree in their forecasts of future events, but
the aggregation of these subjective probability distributions would be a good approxima-
tion to the objective probability distribution of outcomes. Applying this insight to capital
markets, Lintner (1969) shows that
“The market’s composite assessment of the end-of-period aggregate value of
[a] stock is thus the weighted sum of each investor’s judgement”. Consequently,
“. . . the market price of any security will in principle change as a result of any
change in any one of these assessments”.
Thus, investors make decisions based on all available information, and update their
forecast when new information arrives. The current stock price for a firm therefore offers
an aggregation of the forecasts by all investors, and the price is updated as new information
becomes available.
In the first paper of my thesis, I elicit investor expectations to a major news release,
and then test to see if these expectations match the actual outcome. I use the stock
market reaction to the introduction of the Norwegian gender quota on company boards to
estimate the expected impact of this new law on firm value. I find that investors anticipate
that the new directors will be more effective in firms with less information asymmetry
between insiders of the firm and outsiders. As female directors predominantly classify
as external directors, this result is in line with economic theory: Outsiders are at an
informational disadvantage in firms with high information asymmetry. To test if these
expectation are corroborated by the actual outcome, I then investigate changes in the
affected firms’ performance subsequent to the introduction of the new law. The results
are consistent with the stock market reaction, whereby the impact of the quota on firm
performance depends on firms specific information asymmetry.
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Thus, the first paper seems to support the concept of rational expectations, whereby the
stock market’s aggregation of investor forecasts was consistent with the actual subsequent
outcome. But investors may not only differ with respect to the forecast they make but how
they value different outcomes; the utility that they attach to each possible outcome. In
fact, Borch (1962) claims that
“. . . [w]hether two rational persons on the basis of the same information can
arrive at different evaluations of the probability of a specific event, is a question
of semantics. That they may act differently on the same information is well
known, but this can usually be explained assuming that the two persons attach
different utilities to the event.”
Consider a simple gamble with an equal probability of winning either nothing or NOK
2,000. The expected value, or the probability weighted average outcome, is NOK 1,000.
But why would very few people be willing to pay that amount to participate in this gamble?
The answer is that instead of investors valuing gambles based on the expected outcome,
they use a measure of the expected utility that the gamble offers them. This idea dates
back to Bernoulli (1738), who observed that
“. . . the price on the item is dependent only on the thing itself and is equal
for everyone; the utility, however, is dependent on the particular circumstances
of the person making the estimate. Thus there is no doubt that a gain of one
thousand ducats is more significant to a pauper than to a rich man though both
gain the same amount”.1
Thus, the same incremental increase in wealth has a bigger impact on individual utility
when current total wealth is low, compared to when wealth is high. Such an individual
would prefer a certain payment to a gamble with the same expected value. This concept
was later formulated more precisely by von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944), and now
constitutes the standard economic model: Investors make investment decisions to maximize
1The ducat was a gold coin used as currency throughout Europe from the 12th century up to the
beginning of the 20th century. A pauper is a very poor person.
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expected utility, where they take into consideration an individual degree of aversion towards
risk.
However, later empirical tests of this expected utility model found that it did not
adequately describe how real people evaluate investment decisions. Kahneman and Tversky
(1979) propose different monetary gambles to real people, and find that they assign value
to gains and losses, rather than to the final total wealth that each different outcome would
generate. Moreover, they find that whereas people are generally risk averse over gains,
they are attracted to risk when experiencing losses. In addition, around break-even they
are extremely averse to risk. This alternative model is called “prospect theory”. A recent
theoretical paper finds a clear prediction for the owner of an asset who is motivated by
prospect theory: he will tend to sell the asset more readily at a gain than at a loss, and
also have a tendency to liquidate at break-even (Kyle, Ou-Yang and Xiong, 2006). Thus,
being attracted to risk when experiencing a loss tends to induce delayed liquidation of the
stock, whereas the extreme risk aversion close to break-even induces liquidation near this
point.
The investigation of how individual investors actually make decisions is naturally constrai-
ned by access to high quality data. It is difficult to find, and gain access to, detailed data
of individual investment decisions over time. In my second paper, I use a novel investor
accounts dataset from Norway. The data enable me to specifically analyze how each indi-
vidual household investor trades in stocks; the data specifies who owns each of the stocks
on the Oslo Stock Exchange on any day from 2002 to 2007. I find that household investors
are more likely to sell at a gain than at a loss, and they are particularly likely to sell close
to break-even. This trading pattern is therefore consistent with investors motivated by
prospect theory.
In the first two papers of my thesis, I investigate investment decisions in a stock market.
We discovered that although the aggregate of investor expectations is in line with the
relevant economic theory, individual investors seem to deviate from the standard expected
utility model. Thus far we have implicitly assumed that people care only about their own
interest. This assumption has a long standing tradition in economics, and its usefulness in
explaining behavior was well captured as far back as Smith (1776):
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“It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker that
we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest. We address
ourselves, not to their humanity, but to their self-love, and never talk to them
of our own necessities, but of their advantages. Nobody but a beggar chooses to
depend chiefly upon the benevolence of his fellow-citizens.”
However, many investment decisions involve direct interaction, even co-operation, with
other people. When entering into an economic relation with another person, it is often
not possible to write a contract that takes into account all possible future outcomes. Such
incomplete contracts enable opportunistic behavior in unforeseen circumstances, whereby
one party takes advantage of the other. The possibility of opportunistic behavior from the
person you are contracting with will therefore likely lead to underinvestment in the joint
project (Tirole, 1986). This underinvestment in turn leads an inefficient outcome. One
way to mitigate this problem is to trust that the other party will deviate from narrow
self-interest in unforeseen circumstances. We might therefore form expectations about
the trustworthiness of the person we are dealing with. Important when forming these
expectations is an evaluation of what motivates the other person. Is it only narrow self-
interest, or do other preferences come in to play? This question is the subject of the
third and final paper. To answer the question, we conduct an economic experiment where
real people interact anonymously through personal computers. We find that, in their
interactions, people do deviate from narrow-self interest in systematic ways. In particular,
they are motivated by concerns for efficiency, i.e. they care about total production and not
only the fraction of the total that falls to themselves. Such social preferences would then
form part of how people value different possible future outcomes, in addition to narrow
self-interest.
Finally, then, we can conclude that evaluating investment decisions based on the stan-
dard economic model with rational expectations seems to offer a useful approximation at
the aggregate level. However, we have uncovered evidence of important deviations from
this standard economic model at the individual level, which add to our understanding of
how real people make investment decisions.
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The following sub-sections briefly characterize the specific contribution of each the three
papers in the thesis.
“Forced board changes: Evidence from Norway”
The recently introduced gender quota on Norwegian corporate boards dramatically increa-
sed the share of female directors. This reform offers a natural experiment to investigate
changes in corporate governance from forced increases in gender diversity, and whether
these changes in turn impact firm performance. I find that investors anticipate the new
directors to be more effective in firms with less information asymmetry between insiders
of the firm and outsiders. Firms with low information asymmetry experience positive and
significant cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) at the introduction of the quota, whereas
firms with high information asymmetry show negative but insignificant CAR.
“The disposition effect and momentum: Evidence from Norwegian
household investors”
Using a novel investor accounts dataset from Norway, I find that household investors are
particularly likely to sell stocks when they experience a capital gain between 0% and 5%.
The likelihood of a sale falls quickly both below and above this range; big losses and big
gains are equally unlikely to trigger a sale. Thus, the disposition effect is driven by sales
close to break-even, rather than a monotonically increasing relation between current capital
gain and the likelihood of a sale. I also find that this household investor trading pattern
contributes to momentum in small cap stocks.
“Efficiency, equality and reciprocity in social preferences: A com-
parison of students and a representative population”
The debate between Engelmann and Strobel (2004, 2006) and Fehr, Naef and Schmidt
(2006) highlights the important question of the extent to which lab experiments on student
populations can serve to identify the motivational forces present in society at large. We
address this question by comparing the lab behavior of a student group and a non-student
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group, where the non-student group on all observable factors is almost identical to the
representative adult population in Norway. All participants take part in exactly the same
lab experiment. Our study shows that students may not be informative of the role of
social preferences in the broader population. We find that the representative participants
differ fundamentally from students both in their level of selfishness and in the relative
importance assigned to different moral motives. It is also interesting to note that while we
do not find any substantial gender differences among the students, males and females in
the representative group differ fundamentally in their moral motivation.
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Forced board changes: Evidence from Norway
Knut Nygaard∗
9th March 2011
Abstract
The recently introduced gender quota on Norwegian corporate boards dramati-
cally increased the share of female directors. This reform offers a natural experiment
to investigate changes in corporate governance from forced increases in gender diver-
sity, and whether these changes in turn impact firm performance. I find that inves-
tors anticipate the new directors to be more effective in firms with less information
asymmetry between insiders of the firm and outsiders. Firms with low information
asymmetry experience positive and significant cumulative abnormal returns (CAR)
at the introduction of the quota, whereas firms with high information asymmetry
show negative but insignificant CAR.
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With the threat of forced liquidation for non-compliance, the Norwegian government man-
dated a quota of 40% female directors for public limited liability companies (PLC) in 2005.
The average PLC board had 15.5% female directors at the time; and 40.7% three years
later. Several other countries are implementing or considering similar measures to increase
the number of female directors on company boards, e.g Belgium, Canada, Finland, France,
Iceland, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, and Sweden. What can regulators expect to achieve
by imposing a quota on a particular director characteristic, such as gender?
The board of directors has the critical functions of monitoring and advising top mana-
gement (Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003; Adams, Hermalin and Weisbach, 2010). There is
evidence that firms compose their boards in close relation to firm characteristics, which de-
termine the costs and benefits of the board’s monitory and advisory roles (Coles, Daniel and
Naveen, 2008; Linck, Netter and Yang, 2008). These findings suggest that a regulatory fra-
mework imposing uniform requirements on board composition, like the Norwegian gender
quota, could be ill-conceived. Indeed, if firms compose their boards optimally (to maximize
firm value conditional on firm characteristics), any regulatory imposed constraints on board
composition can only reduce firm value.
However, if the CEO dislikes being monitored he will derive private benefits from a
board dominated by directors more aligned with him than with shareholders, irrespective
of firm characteristics. For instance, Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) show how a CEO
through increased bargaining power can influence the board selection process, and thereby
reduce the monitoring prowess of the board. This would generate friction in the selection
of directors, and possibly lead to a gap between the optimal and the actual monitoring
capabilities of the board.
In this paper I use the stock market reaction to the introduction of the Norwegian
gender quota to elicit the expected impact of an increase in female directors on firm value,
conditional on firm specific information asymmetry. This setup is motivated by recent
research showing that female directors predominantly classify as outside directors1, and
that firm specific information asymmetry determines the effectiveness of an outside director
1Staubo (2010) classifies 83% of female directorships in Norway, compared to 50% of male directorships,
as outside directors. Outside directors are defined as not current or former employees, not employees of
closely related firms, not relatives of officers, and not persons with a business relation to the firm. Using
a comparable definition, Adams and Ferreira (2009) classify 84% of US female directorships as outsiders.
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(Raheja, 2005; Adams and Ferreira, 2007; Harris and Raviv, 2008; Duchin, Matsusaka and
Ozbas, 2010). Thus, although outside or female directors are less aligned with the CEO,
and should therefore be better monitors of the same CEO on behalf of shareholders, they are
less likely to be effective in firms with high information asymmetry due to the information
disadvantage they face in such firms. High information asymmetry firms with few female
directors are therefore likely to be hurt by being forced to increase the share of female
directors in order to comply with the gender quota. In contrast, an outside or female
director is likely to be effective in a firm with low information asymmetry. If the firm
nevertheless has few female directors, this could indicate that the board is constituted to
minimize oversight. Low information asymmetry firms with few female directors before the
introduction of the gender quota might therefore benefit from the forced increase in female
directors, due to potentially sub-optimal monitoring pre-reform.
I measure the daily stock returns of firms listed on the Oslo Stock Exchange, relative to
the return on the Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI) World Index, around 9th
December 2005 when the quota was mandated. In OLS regressions controlling for firm size,
board size, and industry sector, I find that firms with low information asymmetry and few
female directors experience positive and significant cumulative abnormal returns (CAR). In
contrast, firms with high information asymmetry and few female directors show negative
but insignificant CAR. Thus, the expected impact of the reform on firm value depends
on firm specific information asymmetry, which is consistent with some firms having sub-
optimal boards prior to the reform. Analysis of change in return on assets in listed firms
from 2004 to 2008 offers evidence consistent with these results, and I do not find evidence
of a selection bias whereby firms de-list in order to avoid the quota.
Ahern and Dittmar (2010) report that the same Norwegian gender quota generated
younger and less experienced boards, which reduced firm value (Tobin Q). I find that
these results may be driven by their particular sampling procedure that over-emphasizes
new firms, with both younger directors and bigger fall in Tobin Q compared to older firms,
rather than by the introduction of the gender quota. Moreover, they do not condition their
analysis on firm specific information asymmetry, which I find to be important in explaining
the impact of the reform.
3
17
The paper is organized as follows: Section 1 offers a background to the Norwegian
gender quota, argues that this reform is a natural experiment to investigate forced increases
in gender diversity on corporate boards, looks at the board selection process in Norway, and
reviews the literature on outside directors and information asymmetry; section 2 presents
the data sources used; section 3 analyses the stock market reaction to the introduction of
the quota; section 4 looks at whether firms changed organizational form in order to avoid
the quota and at how the quota impacted return on assets in affected firms; section 5 relates
my findings to those in Ahern and Dittmar (2010); section 6 concludes.
1 Background and context
1.1 The quota
Under the new law, each gender must make up at least 40% of directors representing ow-
ners, with a less stringent quota for directors representing employees.2 In this paper I
therefore focus on the directors representing owners. The quota was mandated 9th Decem-
ber 2005 and applies to all public limited liability companies (PLC); but not to limited
liability companies (LTD). PLC (“Allmennaksjeselskap”, ASA) is a separate organizational
form designed for large companies with many shareholders and liquid stock, whereas the
LTD organizational form is for small companies with few shareholder and less liquid stock
(Woxholth, 2007). For instance, PLCs can do public offering of stock and list on the Oslo
Stock Exchange, whereas a LTD can only do private placement. There are both listed and
non-listed PLCs, and the quota applies equally to both groups. PLCs registered after 1st
January 2006 had to comply with the new regulation immediately, whereas existing PLCs
had to comply by 1st January 2008. The sanction for not meeting the quota is forced
liquidation. In April 2008 the Norwegian Business Register (“Bronnoysund registrene”)
2With 2 or 3 directors representing owners, each gender must be represented. For 4 or 5 directors, at
least two directors for each gender. From 6 to 8 directors, at least 3 from each gender. For 9 directors, at
least 4 from each gender. For 10 or more directors, at least 40% from each gender. In Norway, employees
in companies above a certain size are entitled to their own directors on the company board, elected by and
from the workforce. Up to one third of directors may be such employee representatives, and a separate
gender quota applies to these directors: For 2 or more directors representing employees, each gender must
be represented, but not if the workforce is dominated (more than 80%) by one gender. Many directors
representing the employees are union representatives (Hagen, 2008).
4
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announced that all PLCs were in compliance, and no firm was forced to liquidate for failing
to meet the quota.
Overall compliance from 2008 onwards is confirmed in Table 1, which reports director
characteristics in all PLCs from 1999 to 2009. In 2008 and 2009 around 2% of PLCs did
not strictly comply with the quota, which is likely due to temporary fluctuations in board
composition. Overall compliance was accomplished without overloading the typical female
director, as the average number of PLC directorships per female director remains stable
over the period at around 1.2. Nor was the increased demand for female directors met
by disproportionate recruitment of directors from outside Norway. From 2003 through to
2009, foreigners as a share of female directors is largely unchanged at around 12%, and
always below the share of foreigners among male directors, which was 15% in 2009. Female
directors are on average somewhat younger than male directors, and the introduction of
the quota does not seem to have widened the age gap by much. In 2005, the average female
director was 45 years old, compared to 51 for the average male director. By 2008, the
average female director was one year older; the average male director was only two years
older than in 2005.
1.2 A natural experiment
The new law investigated in this paper deals only and specifically with gender representation
on corporate boards. The government claimed that the low share of women on corporate
boards was due to traditional ideologies and cultural aspects, which resulted in women
not being considered for these posts. It therefore found it necessary to intervene in order
to arrange for a societal development that acknowledged and made use of both genders’
competences (Ministry of Children, Family and Equality, 2003). Thus, the introduction of
the quota was exogenous to firm performance measures.
A gender quota on corporate boards was first suggested in 1999, and a conditional
law amendment on the quota passed the Norwegian Parliament in 2003. However, the
government continued to encourage voluntary compliance before surprisingly mandating the
quota in December 2005 with the sanction of forced liquidation. See the appendix for a full
account of the legislative process. Following a favorable vote in the Norwegian Parliament, a
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law proposal needs a sanction and a mandate to become binding law. Both these additional
steps are taken by the government, and usually immediately following the vote in the
Parliament. However, neither of these steps were taken in the case of the gender quota
in 2003. This was because the law contained a “self-destruct” clause: If firms voluntarily
complied with the quota by mid-2005, the law would not be mandated. Therefore, there
was uncertainty about whether the law would ever be binding. Moreover, there was no
specific sanction associated with the law until the day it was mandated. The government
surprisingly opted for forced liquidation as the sanction for non-compliance. Just a few
days before the law was mandated, the Prime Minister had said in a public statement that
if the quota was to become binding law the sanction for non-compliance would most likely
be a fine (“Verdens Gang”, Norway’s largest daily newspaper, 1st December 2005). Finally,
the law proposal specified that if the law was mandated, firms would have two years to
recruit the required female directors.
Thus, a firm that, for whatever reason, resisted female directors is unlikely to have
changed their director selection procedures before December 2005, when they were forced
to do so by law. Table 1 shows that a full 79.9% of firms were not in compliance with
the law at the end of 2005, and the reform had a massive impact on board composition
thereafter. The average PLC board had 15.5% female directors in 2005, compared to 40.7%
in 2008. The share of female directors on Norwegian PLC boards prior to the introduction
of the gender quota is similar to other comparable countries. Adams and Ferreira (2009)
report 14.8% female directors in Fortune 500 firms in the US, 8.7% in Australia, 10.6% in
Canada and 8.0% in Europe (based on various data sources from 2004 to 2007).
1.3 The selection of directors in Norway
In this section I argue that there is room for the CEO to express personal preferences
in the selection of directors in Norwegian PLCs, at least prior to the reform, and that
these preferences could have substantial influence over the selection process. This potential
friction is important because it may have generated sub-optimal board structures, to the
extent that the CEO derives personal benefits from being monitored less. In fact, Norwegian
firms ranked next to last out of 14 European countries in a corporate governance ranking
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from 2001 (“Okonomisk rapport” 21/2001), just above Portugal. The review highlights
that Norwegian boards use independent sub-committees to a very limited extent, and they
do not communicate enough information to shareholders.
Norwegian corporate law does not regulate how candidates are nominated for election to
the board. It is nevertheless common for firms to have a nomination committee elected at
the shareholders’ annual meeting. Following communication with management, the current
board and large shareholders, the nominating committee proposes the list of candidates,
which is then voted on at the shareholders’ annual meeting. In an exhaustive study of
Norwegian ownership structure on the Oslo Stock Exchange, Bohren and Odegaard (2006)
conclude that Norwegian firms have remarkably low concentration of ownership relative
to comparable countries. The lack of large shareholders could increase the CEO’s relative
influence on the director nomination process. Moreover, an analysis of all firms listed on
the Oslo Stock Exchange in 2005 found that 60% of firms offered no or very limited in-
formation about the nomination committee (Nymark and Thaysen, 2006). This seeming
lack of transparency could arguably augment the influence of the CEO in the nominating
process. Finally, most large Norwegian firms have a corporate assembly (“Bedriftsforsam-
ling”), in which case the vote on directors is done there rather than at the shareholders’
annual meeting. Such a setup would further distance the election of directors from direct
shareholder scrutiny.
The personal preferences of the CEO likely have less to do with direct discrimination
of women, and more to do with CEOs selecting people in their informal networks (Becker,
1971). If informal networks are important for director recruitment, and women are generally
outside such networks, then the result would be fewer female directors. Indeed, in a survey
of Norwegian male business leaders prior to the reform, 66% of the respondents say that
women do not participate in the “forums” where recruitment to boards take place (NHO,
2003). A survey of PLC directors done prior to the reform reports that male directors were
five times more likely than female directors to cite informal networks as the primary vehicle
for their recruitment to the board (ECON, 2003).
Thus, there seems to be room for the CEO’s personal preferences to influence the
selection of directors in Norwegian PLCs, at least prior to the reform. To the extent
7
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that the CEO derives personal benefits from being monitored less, this would constitute a
potential friction that could generate sub-optimal board structures.
1.4 Outside directors and information asymmetry
Outside directors, largely independent from the CEO, should be in a better position to
monitor the same CEO on behalf of shareholders (Fama and Jensen, 1983). Rosenstein
and Wyatt (1990) and Nguyen and Nielsen (2010) show that shareholders value the very
independence of an outside director, over and above the individual skills and competence
of that director. Nevertheless, shareholders may not always prefer a board dominated by
outside directors. The board of directors has two primary roles: monitoring and advising
(Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003; Adams et al., 2010). A new strand of research argues that
the effectiveness of outside directors in performing both these roles is constrained by their
access to information (Raheja, 2005; Adams and Ferreira, 2007; Harris and Raviv, 2008;
Duchin et al., 2010). Although outside directors are privy to non-public information about
the company, outside directors are at an informational disadvantage relative to insiders of
the firm.
Such information asymmetries have long been acknowledged in economics. For instance,
Myers and Majluf (1984) point out that the informational advantage of firm insiders goes
beyond proprietary information. Insiders know better what the proprietary information
means for the firm. They have an insider’s view of the organization and what it can
and cannot do. This organizational knowledge it is part of the insiders’ human capital;
acquired by conscious effort and through trial and error. Educating outsiders takes time
and money. Thus, there is an inherent informational asymmetry between insiders of the
firm and outsiders, specific to each firm, which makes it costly or time consuming for an
outside director to access and evaluate information about the firm. Indeed, Ravina and
Sapienza (2010) find that both outside and inside directors earn abnormal profits when
trading in their companies’ stocks, but inside directors earn better returns than outside
directors.
Thus, the effectiveness of an outside director depends on the degree of information
asymmetry between insiders of the firm and outsiders. With less information asymmetry,
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it is easier for an outside director to transform her general expertise to a specific firm
and become an effective director. Based on this information asymmetry, therefore, some
firms would optimally choose to have an insider dominated board, and others an outsider
dominated board.
If firms compose their boards optimally according to the information asymmetry bet-
ween insiders of the firm and outsiders, then any regulatory imposed increase in the share
of outside directors can only reduce firm value. However, if the CEO dislikes being monito-
red he will derive private benefits from a board dominated by directors more aligned with
him than with shareholders, irrespective of the firm specific information asymmetry. This
would generate friction in the selection of directors, and possibly lead to a gap between
the optimal and the actual share of outside directors. This friction would be particularly
detrimental to a low information asymmetry firm; less so for a high information asymmetry
firm, which optimally has more inside directors. If a firm with low information asymmetry
has very few outside directors due to this friction, a reform that increases the share of
outside directors, for instance by increasing the share of female directors, will increase firm
value. On the other hand, a firm with high information asymmetry could decrease in value
from the same reform.
Duchin et al. (2010) show that the impact on firm performance of the exogenous increase
in outside directors generated by the US Sarbannes-Oxley Act (SOX) of 2002 depends
on firm specific information asymmetry.3 They find that outside directors improve firm
performance when information asymmetry is low, and hurt performance when information
asymmetry is high. This evidence is consistent with high information asymmetry firms
already having constituted their board optimally with many inside directors, and that the
legislated increase in outside directors was harmful to these firms. On the other hand, low
information asymmetry firms had constituted their boards with few outsiders to minimize
3SOX defines an outside director as a person who does not accept any fee from the appointing firm
(other than as director) and is not an affiliated person of the firm or any subsidiary. It requires that all
members of corporate audit commitees are outside directors. SOX generated changes in the regulations
of the NYSE and Nasdaq stock exchanges in 2003, beyond that required by SOX. The NYSE defines an
outside director as a person who has no material relationship with the company; a majority of directors,
and all members of the compensation and nominating committees must be outsiders. The Nasdaq defines
an outsider as a person who does not have a relationship with the company that would interfere with
independent judgment; a majority on the board, and the compensation and nominating committees, must
be outsiders.
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oversight, and the increase in outside directors was therefore helpful in these firms.
Recent research from Norway, Sweden and the US suggests that female directors differ
from male directors; they are more likely to align with shareholders (Staubo, 2010; Adams
and Funk, 2010; Adams and Ferreira, 2009). The reasons pointed to are institutional
arrangements, e.g. women are less likely to be members of the “old boys club”, and that
women tend to be more universally concerned than men. As such, an increase in the
share of female directors is equivalent to an increase in the share of outside directors. The
impact on firm performance of the exogenous increase in female directors generated by the
Norwegian gender quota should therefore depend on firm specific information asymmetry.
This relation is what I set out to test in this paper.
2 Data sources
Data on board composition for all Norwegian PLCs is compiled by the Norwegian Business
Register (“Bronnoysundregistrene”). The dataset covers all board members in all PLCs
(listed and non-listed) registered each year from 1999 to 2009, and includes the background
information that firms are required by law to report: name, age, gender, and nationality.
This data was presented in Table 1. Also from the Norwegian Business Register, I have
aggregate board composition data for each PLC at the monthly frequency up to March 2008.
Daily Oslo Stock Exchange (OSE) stock prices, including split/reverse split and dividend
adjustments, and index data are from the Stock Exchange database at the Norwegian School
of Economics and Business Administration (NHH). I collect daily series of the MSCI World
Index from Thomson Reuters Datastream, and NOK/USD exchange rate data from the
Norwegian Central Bank. Accounting data and business sector information up to 2008 are
from the NHH database constructed by Mjos and Oksnes (2010).
My measure of information asymmetry is based on a survey of all Norwegian listed firms
done by the auditing firm PricewaterhouseCoopers (PWC) in 2005 on behalf of the OSE.
In preparation for a corporate governance initiative, the OSE wanted to gauge how much
information each firm revealed about its governance structure through public information.
Thus, the PWC survey measures the quality and availability of public information on the
governance structure in each firm, and not a firm’s relative compliance with a code of
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practice. PWC evaluated each firm listed on the OSE, placing a score from 0 to 3 on each
of 14 dimensions4 for a maximum total information score of 42 points for each firm. A
score of zero indicates that there was no information on a particular dimension. A score
of one indicates very limited information; two points average information; and three points
adequate information. The lesser quality and availability of information about a firm, the
higher is the information asymmetry between insiders of the firm and outsiders. I normalize
the information score of each firm by the maximum score to get an information index from
zero to one. Thus, for each firm i
Information indexi =
Total information scorei
42
(1)
Figure 1 provides a histogram of the information index for all firms. We observe a rather
even distribution, with a mean (and median) value of 0.4. Some firms have an information
index of zero. This means that efforts to locate relevant public information on these firms
were unsuccessful along all the 14 dimensions.
3 The impact of the reform on firm value
The announcement on 9th December 2005 that the quota would be mandated, with the
threat of forced liquidation, came as a surprise. To the extent that the ensuing influx of
female directors was relevant for the valuation of the firms, investors would right away
incorporate into the stock price the expected net present value of the costs and benefits of
the quota for each particular firm. Work on the new law started before it was mandated. If
the effects of the quota were already anticipated and therefore partly included in prices, the
events on 9th December 2005 removed all uncertainty about whether the quota would be
made binding law, and to the surprise of the market added the sanction of forced liquidation
for non-compliance. Any residual price effects generated by the introduction of the quota
would therefore be captured on this date. To examine if there were any valuation effects of
4Implementation and reporting on corporate governance; Business, objectives and strategies; Equity,
dividend policy and capital increase; Equal treatment of shareholders and transactions with close associates;
Freely negotiable shares; General meetings; Nomination committee; Corporate assembly and board of
directors: composition and independence; The work of the board of directors; Renumeration of the board of
directors; Renumeration of the executive personnel; Information and communications; Take-overs; Auditor.
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the quota, I estimate the abnormal announcement stock returns for the firms on the Oslo
Stock Exchange (OSE) around 9th December 2005.
I estimate the abnormal return for firm i on day t as ARit = Rit − (αˆi + βˆiRmt), where
Rit is the return on the stock of firm i on day t; Rmt is the return on the MSCI World Index;
and αˆi and βˆi are the coefficients estimated from the single-factor market model Rit = αi +
βiRmt+εit over the days −255 to −6.5 To account for the possibility of information overflow
before the announcement, and underreaction on the announcement day, I calculate the
cumulative abnormal return for five different return windows: (−1,+1), (−2,+2), (−3,+3),
(−4,+4), and (−5,+5), all centered on 9th December 2005. The cumulative abnormal
return (CAR) for a window that starts at day −k and ends at day +k is CARi(−k,+k) =∑k
t=−k ARit.
I first calculate the simple average CAR for all firms, in addition to four subgroups based
on firm specific information asymmetry and the pre-announcement share of female directors.
Table 2 shows the results. From Panel A we see that the average OSE firm experienced
positive abnormal returns on the introduction of the gender quota. For all the five return
windows, ACAR is significantly positive. Panel B shows the results for the firms with low
information asymmetry and few female directors. Across all the five investigated windows,
ACAR is significantly positive for this group. Firms with low information asymmetry and
many female directors would not be much affected by the new law, and Panel C reveals that
the measured ACAR for these firms is not significant. Panels D and E relate the results
for firms with high information asymmetry. For some of the return windows investigated,
ACAR is significantly positive. Overall, the results support the conjecture that the forced
increase in gender diversity added value to firms with low information asymmetry.
5Results are similar when I use the OSE All Share Index (OSEAX) or the OSE Benchmark Index
(OSEBX) instead of the MSCI World Index. OSEAX includes all shares listed on OSE; OSEBX the most
traded shares. Both indices are value weighted and adjusted for dividend payments. The MSCI index
includes a large collection of stocks from all the developed markets in the world. I use the price index in
US Dollars, which is adjusted for dividends. I then convert the MSCI index to NOK using the NOK/USD
daily exchange rate.
12
26
3.1 CAR controlling for sector and size
To specifically test the relation between an increase in the share of female directors and
firm value conditional on information asymmetry, I want to control for possible sector-wide
shocks and firms size. I therefore perform OLS regressions of CAR, separately for low and
high information asymmetry firms, on an indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm has
less than the median share of female directors in November 2005. This dummy captures
the valuation impact on the firms most affected by the quota.6 I also include controls for
the logarithm of the market value of equity, the total number of directors, and industry
sector indicator variables. Table 3 gives the results. In the low information asymmetry
group (panel A), firms with relatively few female directors experience strong and positive
abnormal returns over each of the return windows. This means that investors expected
the impact of the reform in these firms to be positive. In panel B, where I look at high
information asymmetry firms, the coefficient estimate on the dummy variable for few female
directors is negative, but not significant in either of the return windows. Thus, the impact
on firms affected by the Norwegian gender quota seems to depend on the information
asymmetry between insiders of the firm and outsiders, as expected. This result suggests
that an increase in female directors is tantamount to an increase in outside directors, which
is valuable only for certain firms.
4 Robustness
4.1 Conversion from PLC to LTD
After the gender quota was mandated, there was a subsequent drop in the number of PLCs.
It is possible that firms hurt by the forced change of board members chose to instead take
the LTD corporate form, and thus avoid being subject to the reform. The last row in Table
1 shows that the number of PLCs dropped each year from 2006 to 2009: from 505 firms
down to 360; a drop of 28.7%. In this section, I investigate the potential selection issue
6Results are similar when this dummy instead equals one if the firm needs more than the median
percentage or absolute number of women to meet the quota, else zero. F-tests show that, in each of the five
windows, the explanatory variables have different impacts on the two sub-samples low and high information
asymmetry firms.
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associated with this decline in the number of PLCs.
A non-listed PLC could easily convert to LTD, while a listed PLC would first have to
delist from the OSE, and then convert to LTD in order to avoid the quota. Moverover, a
non-listed PLC is likely to exhibit higher information asymmetry between insiders of the
firm and outsiders compared to a listed firm, as there is less public information available
than for listed firms. As highlighted in Section 1.4, a firm with high information asymmetry
is likely to optimally resist outside directors. Therefore, to the extent that firms converted
from PLC to LTD in order to avoid the gender quota, I expect this issue to be particularly
relevant for non-listed PLCs.
Figure 2 shows the rate of conversion from PLC to LTD separately for listed and non-
listed PLCs from 1999 to 2008. The conversion rate is always higher for non-listed PLCs,
and there is a peak in 2006, the year after the quota was mandated. Table 4 reports on
the firm characteristics over the same years, separately for listed and non-listed PLCs. On
average, listed PLCs are less likely to convert; have a higher share of female directors;
have bigger boards; are older; are more likely to have directors representing employees; and
have higher book asset values. The mean values are significantly different between the two
groups for all these variables (p < 0.01). Non-listed PLCs have slightly higher equity ratio
compared to listed PLCs, and the return on assets is not significantly different between the
two groups. See Table 4 for variable definitions.
To test whether the conversion rate is associated with the quota, I investigate whether
converting firms systematically had few female directors. To do this I perform OLS re-
gressions each year from 1999 to 2008 of the conversion decision on the share of female
directors the same year, controlling for firm characteristics. This constitutes a test of the
conditional correlation between the conversion decision and the share of female directors
at the time of the conversion decision.
Table 5 and Table 6 show the results for listed and non-listed PLCs, respectively. We
observe that there is no correlation between the conversion decision and the share of female
directors for listed firms. This indicates that the stock price reaction I report in this paper
does not suffer from a selection bias caused by firms delisting subsequent to the introduction
of the quota in order to avoid the quota. For non-listed PLCs, however, there is a strong
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negative correlation between the conversion decision and the share female directors in both
2006 and 2007. This corresponds well with the legislative process of the quota outlined in
Section 1, whereby the quota only had an impact after it was mandated in December 2005.
4.2 Return on assets
The stock market reaction suggests that investors expected the quota to impact firm per-
formance differently depending on firm specific information asymmetry. In this subsection
I investigate whether this result is corroborated by changes in return on assets in the af-
fected firms. In investigating the effect of the quota on firm performance, I am interested
specifically in firm performance from 2004 to 2008. The quota was mandated towards the
end of 2005, and 1st January 2008 was the final deadline to have the new women physically
on the board. Thus, 2008 was the first year that all affected firms were in compliance, and
I start the analysis one year before the law was introduced.
Reminiscent of the setup in Duchin et al. (2010), my empirical model assumes that
firm performance is determined by the following relation:
ROAit = β1Fit + β2FitIi + β3Ii + · · ·+ γXi + λSt + it, (2)
where i indexes a firm, t indexes a year, ROA is return on assets, F is the share of female
directors, I is the information index score, X holds other firm specific effects, and S is time
specific effects (captured by year dummies). This relation assumes that performance and
the share of female directors vary over time, and that the information index does not vary
over time. The setup allows for the marginal effect of female directors on performance to
depend on information asymmetry, which is a firm specific effect: ∂ROA/∂F = β1 + β2I.
Instead of estimating equation (2), I estimate the first difference relation:
4ROAi = β14Fi + β2(4Fi × Ii) + · · ·+ λ4S +4i, (3)
where 4Z ≡ Z2008 − Z2004. This removes the firm-specific effects, the time-specific effects
are reduced to a constant, and the information index remains only in the interaction term.
In the regressions I also add the following control variables: board size, equity ratio, firm
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age, indicator variable for employee representative on the board, total assets, market value
of equity, and Tobin Q. All these control variables are from 2004, and thus account for
the initial conditions. Norway transitioned from domestic GAAP (Generally Accepted
Accounting Principles) to IFRS (International Financial Reporting Standards) in 2005.
Beisland and Knivsflaa (2010) find that IFRS represents a less conservative accounting
framework than the Norwegian GAAP, which could lead to an increase in listed firms’
book value of assets from 2005 with an associated reduction in ROA even with unchanged
earnings. This transition would impact all firms, but there might also be sector specific
variation in how firm respond to these rule changes. I therefore include industry-sector
indicator variables in all the regressions.
Following Duchin et al. (2010), I perform an “instrumented approach”. In this setup I
first regress the change in the share of female directors on a dummy variable that is equal to
one if the firm did not comply with the quota in 2004, in addition to the control variables.
Then I take the predicted changes in the share of female directors from this regression, in
place of the actual change, to estimate equation (3).
The results are reported in Table 7: Column 1 shows the results from the first stage
of the instrumented approach, and Column 2 and Column 3 the results from the second
stage regression without and with the information index interaction term. From Column
1, we see that whether the firm was compliant with the quota in 2004 is a strong predictor
of changes in the share of female directors, making compliance in 2004 a useful instrument
for future changes in the share of female directors. Column 2 shows that the coefficient
estimate on predicted change in the share of female directors is close to zero and insignificant
(p-value = 0.780). In Column 3, where I include the information index interaction term,
the coefficient estimate on change in share of female directors is now negative and becomes
bigger in absolute terms, but is not significantly different from zero at standard significance
levels (p-value = 0.366). The coefficient estimate on the information index interaction term
is positive and significant at the 10% level (p-value = 0.087). This means that among firms
that had to increase the share of female directors to comply with the quota, the firms with
low information asymmetry (i.e. high information index score) benefited more from the
change than high information asymmetry firms did. Although the coefficient on the change
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in share of female directors is not significant at standard significance levels, the size of the
coefficient is large enough that it would partly off-set the positive effect from the interaction
term, and even generate a negative impact on high information asymmetry firms.7 These
results are consistent with the stock market reaction presented in this paper, whereby the
impact of the quota on firm performance depends on firm specific information asymmetry.
5 Comparison with Ahern and Dittmar (2010)
Ahern and Dittmar (2010) investigate the same Norwegian gender quota and report so-
mewhat different results from those presented here. In this section I relate their findings
to mine. I find that their particular sampling procedure seems to account for their results.
Moreover, they do not condition their analysis on firm specific information asymmetry,
which I find to be important in explaining the impact of the reform.
Ahern and Dittmar (2010) undertake the huge taks of hand collecting background in-
formation on directors in Norwegian firms listed in 2007. They collect this information on
these firms from 2001 to 2008, which of course introduces a sampling bias in years other
than 2007. If more than half a firm’s board has missing data they drop the firm-year obser-
vation. They thereby construct one of the most comprehensive databases used for academic
research on directors in a single country. My dataset on board members, presented in Table
1, is constructed by the Norwegian Business Register and contains all board members in
all PLCs (listed and non-listed) registered each year from 1999 to 2009, but includes only
the background information that firms are required to report by law: name, age, gender,
and nationality.
Ahern and Dittmar (2010) first investigate the stock market reaction to the quota on
22nd February 2002, and find a reduction in the market value of the OSE firms in their
sample. On that day, the Minister of Trade and Industry supported the idea of a quota in a
newspaper interview. However, all work on the law, both prior and subsequent to this date,
7To see this, consider a firm that increases the share of female directors by 25%, which is around the
average increase for non-compliant firms. The change in ROA would depend on the information index:
4ROAi = −0.242 ∗ 0.25 + 0.595 ∗ 0.25 ∗ Ii. Thus, 4ROAi = 0 for Ii ≈ 0.41, which is close to the average
value of the information index. For higher values of Ii (i.e. low information asymmetry firms) 4ROAi is
positive; for lower values of Ii (i.e. high information asymmetry firms) 4ROAi is negative.
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is done by the Ministry of Children, Family and Equality; not Trade and Industry. This
date is therefore not highlighted in the appendix on the legislative process of the new law.
In addition, their sampling procedure forces them to investigate the stock market reaction
in 2002 only on firms that were also listed in 2007. Their regressions include 47 firms, less
than one third the number of firms included in my analysis. Moreover, they do not control
for firm specific variation in exposure to market risk or industry sector effects, which I do
in the tests presented here. It is therefore not clear that the negative stock market reaction
reported by Ahern and Dittmar (2010) was generated by the gender quota.
Next, Ahern and Dittmar (2010) find that young directors with less experience is as-
sociated with reduced market value (Tobin’s Q). They argue that this is a result of the
gender quota. However, their sampling bias in years other than 2007 generates an em-
phasis on new firms in their analysis, which could account for this result. The law was
effective from 1st January 2006, and firms established after this date would have to comply
immediately whereas already established firms had two years to comply. Not only would
new firms have to comply to the gender quota right away, they also likely attract younger
directors. In unreported work, I identify 87 new PLCs registered in 2006 (of which 15 were
listed), and 94 new PLCs in 2007 (of which 24 were listed). These 39 new listed firms would
constitute more than half the firms that enter the analysis of Tobin Q and board member
characteristics in Ahern and Dittmar (2010). Both male and female directors in these new
firms are significantly younger than the directors in already existing firms. Moreover, these
new firms experience a significantly bigger reduction in Tobin Q up to 2008 than did the
firms established before 2006. Thus, the relation between young directors with less expe-
rience and lower Tobin’s Q reported by Ahern and Dittmar (2010) could be an artifact of
their sampling procedure that over-emphasizes new firms, rather than a result from the
introduction of the gender quota.
6 Conclusion
The gender quota on Norwegian corporate boards dramatically increased the share of fe-
male directors. I find that the impact of the reform on firm value depends on the firm
specific information asymmetry between insiders of the firm and outsiders. This result
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points to several conclusions. First, an increase in female directors is tantamount to an
increase in outside directors. With less information asymmetry, it is easier for an outside or
female director to transform her general expertise to a specific firm and become an effective
director. Second, some firms had sub-optimal governance structure before the introduction
of the quota, and the increased monitoring with more female directors on the board was
beneficial for these firms. I also find suggestive evidence that high information asymmetry
firms were hurt by the same reform, as they would have had to alter an already optimal
governance structure to comply with the quota. Though the evidence of a negative impact
from the Norwegian gender quota is mostly insignificant at standard levels of statistical
significance, it does offer caution to regulators who think there are only benefits to forced
gender diversity on corporate boards.
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Appendix: The legislative process
• October 1999: The first public hearing on gender representation in private com-
pany boards. The government sent out a proposal to overhaul of the entire gender
equality act from 1978. Among other things gender representation on boards. The
1978 law specified a minimum of 40% of both genders on committees appointed by
a public body. This hearing suggested four possible extensions of the quota: (1)
wholly government owned enterprises, (2) partly government owned enterprises, (3)
businesses listed on the Oslo Stock Exchange, (4) boards generally (including LTD
and foundations). The proposal intended for this to be covered by gender equality
law, not corporate law. Several different alternatives as to how to implement the new
law were discussed. The hearing includes the following suggestion for new law: “On
the boards of all listed firms both genders must be represented. For boards with 4 or
more members, each gender shall be represented by at least 25%.”
• July 2001: Second public hearing. The government takes out gender representation
on boards as a separate issue from the overhaul of the gender equality law. The
proposal suggests that the quota is incorporated into corporate law instead of the
gender equality law; now with a higher 40% target. The proposal presented three
models: (1) quota for government owned firms only, (2) also PLCs, i.e. listed firms
and non-listed PLCs, (3) no quota but instead a demand for gender representation in
the nomination process for board election.
• 8th March 2002: The government announce that they will continue the work towards
a law proposal. They explicitly state that they invite cooperation with the private
sector for a voluntary increase in female representation, rather than making a quota
mandatory through law.
• April 2003: In relation with the public hearings on the issue, both the business
community and the government initiated several programmes to increase the share
of women on boards, and also to specifically increase skills for prospective board
members. An online database was also established (“Kvinnebasen”), where women
interested in board membership could register. As of April 2003 this database held
3,500 women (Ministry of Children, Family and Equality, 2003).
• 13th June 2003: The law proposal is presented. It covers goverment owned companies
and all PLCs, with a quota of 40%. Importantly, it includes a voluntary compliance
deadline, which is set to 1th July 2005. If firms meet the required ratio by that date,
the law will not be mandated, i.e. it will be stricken from existence.
• 27th November 2003: The law passes Parliament’s lower chamber (“Odelstinget”)
with broad majority.
• 9th December 2003: The law passes Parliament’s upper chamber (“Lagtinget”)
without comments.
• 19th December 2003: The law is formally included into Norwegian corporate law,
though still under the condition that voluntary compliance by 1st July 2005 would
completely void the law. The law does not have a sanction or a mandate, i.e. it is not
binding.
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• 1st July 2005: The passing of the voluntary deadline for compliance generated mas-
sive media attention on gender diversity, and public debate on the law in Norway. A
business daily (“Finansavisen”) establishes a free online database that lists the gen-
der composition in each PLC board. The public debate centered on whether a quota
should be made mandatory by law at all, and, if so, what sanctions should be put in
place.
• 9th December 2005: The government decides to put the new law into effect. Prior
to this date, the law had no mandate nor any specified associated sanction. The
government opted for forced liquidation as the sanction for non-compliance. This is
surprising. Just a few days earlier the Prime Minister made a public statement where
he specifically stated that the government would most likely associate fines with the
law, if mandated (“Verdens Gang”, 1st December 2005).
• 1st January 2006: All PLCs registered after this date had to comply with the quota
immediately. Existing firms are given two years to comply.
• 1st January 2008: Final deadline. 77 PLC are in not in compliance with the law.
These receive a letter from the Norwegian Business Register informing them to comply
by February 2008. 12 of these firms had still not made the necessary arrangements by
that deadline, and were given a final warning to comply or be dissolved.
• April 2008: All PLCs are in compliance, and no firm was forced to liquidate for
failing to meet the quota.
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Figure 1: histogram of the information index
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Notes: The figure reports the distribution of the information index, defined in equation (1).
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Figure 2: Conversion from PLC to LTD
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Notes: The figure plots the conversion rate for listed and non-listed PLCs, separately. A conver-
ting firm is one that is registered as a PLC in the current year, but is no longer registered as a
PLC the subsequent year. This conversion decision is then cleaned for firms that in the current
or subsequent year are no longer registered as active, are bankrupt, or do not report sales revenue
(accounting data available up to 2008). Converting firms therefore include firms that convert
due to mergers and acqusition activity. Such activity is not likely to be systematically related to
the share of female directors.
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Table 1: Director characteristics, all Norwegian PLCs, 1999-2009
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Firms that did or did not comply with the gender quota, percentage
Comply 2.1 2.2 3.8 5.3 7.2 10.6 20.1 40.4 80.3 97.8 98.3
Not comply 97.9 97.8 96.2 94.7 92.8 89.4 79.9 59.6 19.7 2.2 1.7
Directors (owner representative), percentage by gender
Men 96.8 96.5 96.0 94.9 93.2 90.7 84.5 76.8 64.3 59.3 59.2
Women 3.2 3.5 4.0 5.1 6.8 9.3 15.5 23.2 35.7 40.7 40.8
Average number of PLC directorships per person (owner representative), separately by gender
Men 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.2 1.2 1.2
Women 1.2 1.2 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.2 1.2 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3
Foreign directors (owner representative), percentage separately by gender
Men 13.1 14.9 14.0 13.5 13.3 14.3 15.0 16.2 14.9 15.7 15.1
Women 4.7 7.3 6.9 8.8 11.7 12.4 9.9 12.7 11.1 12.8 13.0
Average age of directors (owner representative), separately by gender
Men 48.8 48.4 48.5 49.3 49.9 50.4 50.6 50.8 51.7 52.8 53.4
Women 45.2 44.5 45.7 46.0 47.0 46.4 45.3 44.9 45.6 46.2 47.1
Directors (employee representative), percentage by gender
Men 81.5 83.1 80.3 79.1 77.5 74.7 73.2 73.2 69.1 67.3 74.0
Women 18.5 16.9 19.7 20.9 22.5 25.3 26.8 26.8 30.9 32.7 26.0
Chair of the board, percentage by gender
Men 97.9 99.0 98.7 98.5 97.3 97.5 97.6 97.0 95.0 93.2 93.0
Women 2.1 1.0 1.3 1.5 2.7 2.5 2.4 3.0 5.0 6.8 7.0
Dir. (Owner) 2,484 2,833 2,945 2,797 2,575 2,413 2,333 2,401 2,250 1,945 1,677
Dir. (All) 2,762 3,099 3,199 3,064 2,834 2,673 2,585 2,637 2,492 2,187 1,907
Firms 524 602 630 600 553 521 493 505 483 414 360
Notes: The table reports director characteristics based on all PLCs registered in Norway 31th
December each year from 1999 to 2009. Dir. (Owner) counts the number of directorships
representing owners, Dir. (All) counts all directorships, and the difference between the two gives
the number directorships representing employees.
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Table 2: Average cumulative abnormal return
Return windows
(-1,+1) (-2,+2) (-3,+3) (-4,+4) (-5,+5)
Panel A: All firms
ACAR 0.008 0.012 0.016 0.020 0.016
Ordinary test stat. (3.311) (4.998) (7.029) (8.528) (6.954)
Ordinary cross sectional test stat. (2.029) (2.243) (2.912) (3.096) (2.193)
Ratio positive CAR 0.477 0.490 0.569 0.582 0.536
Sign test stat. (0.566) (0.243) (1.698) (2.021) (0.889)
Firms/Observations 153 153 153 153 153
Panel B: Firms with low information asymmetry and few female directors
ACAR 0.033 0.049 0.057 0.077 0.072
Ordinary test stat. (5.100) (7.634) (8.917) (11.916) (11.182)
Ordinary cross sectional test stat. (1.936) (2.921) (2.537) (3.515) (3.248)
Ratio positive CAR 0.619 0.714 0.619 0.762 0.667
Sign test stat. (1.091) (1.964) (1.091) (2.400) (1.528)
Firms/Observations 21 21 21 21 21
Panel C: Firms with low information asymmetry and many female directors
ACAR 0.003 0.008 0.007 0.005 -0.002
Ordinary test stat. (0.850) (1.943) (1.706) (1.188) (-0.527)
Ordinary cross sectional test stat. (0.703) (1.181) (0.904) (0.567) (-0.156)
Ratio positive CAR 0.455 0.491 0.582 0.527 0.436
Sign test stat. (0.674) (0.135) (1.214) (0.405) (0.944)
Firms/Observations 55 55 55 55 55
Panel D: Firms with high information asymmetry and few female directors
ACAR 0.008 0.012 0.018 0.026 0.021
Ordinary test stat. (1.327) (2.054) (3.032) (4.318) (3.477)
Ordinary cross sectional test stat. (0.826) (0.863) (1.305) (1.745) (1.435)
Ratio positive CAR 0.448 0.448 0.552 0.552 0.586
Sign test stat. (0.557) (0.557) (0.557) (0.557) (0.928)
Firms/Observations 29 29 29 29 29
Panel E: Firms with high information asymmetry and many female directors
ACAR 0.010 0.017 0.021 0.014 0.012
Ordinary test stat. (2.391) (4.069) (5.159) (3.441) (3.007)
Ordinary cross sectional test stat. (1.945) (2.000) (2.449) (0.923) (0.813)
Ratio positive CAR 0.543 0.486 0.600 0.629 0.571
Sign test stat. (0.507) (0.169 ) (1.183) (1.521) (0.845)
Firms/Observations 35 35 35 35 35
Notes: The table reports the average CAR for all listed PLCs. See Table 3 for details on
the CAR estimation, and information asymmetry and female director classifications. All ACARs
are tested if significantly different from zero using tests outlined in Boehmer, Masumeci and
Poulsen (1991). Results are similar for ordinary and standardized test statistics; I report only the
ordinary test statistics. All test statistics assume that the null distribution is standard normal.
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Table 3: Regressions with cumulative abnormal return
Return windows
(-1,+1) (-2,+2) (-3,+3) (-4,+4) (-5,+5)
Panel A: Firms with low information asymmetry
Few female directors 0.027* 0.042** 0.052** 0.072*** 0.070***
(0.016) (0.019) (0.025) (0.023) (0.024)
Market value, logarithm -0.002 0.007 0.009 0.010 0.003
(0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.012)
Board size -0.001 -0.010** -0.010 -0.010 -0.005
(0.004) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.009)
Constant 0.038 -0.096 -0.151 -0.171 -0.035
(0.107) (0.119) (0.153) (0.148) (0.240)
R2 0.174 0.190 0.197 0.286 0.163
Firms/Observations 75 75 75 75 75
Panel B: Firms with high information asymmetry
Few female directors -0.007 -0.016 -0.013 -0.002 -0.003
(0.012) (0.014) (0.014) (0.018) (0.019)
Market value, logarithm -0.003 0.000 0.002 0.005 0.005
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006)
Board size -0.003 -0.007* -0.008 -0.011* -0.008
(0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006)
Constant 0.094 0.035 -0.023 -0.035 -0.018
(0.066) (0.093) (0.102) (0.112) (0.122)
R2 0.164 0.503 0.464 0.416 0.356
Firms/Observations 64 64 64 64 64
Notes: The table reports results from cross sectional OLS regressions of CAR, separately for low
and high information asymmetry firms. A high information asymmetry firm has an information
index score below the median value; the remaining firms are classified as low information asymme-
try firms. The event windows are centered on 9th December 2005, the date when the gender quota
was mandated. CAR is calculated over each of the (-1,+1), (-2,+2), (-3,+3), (-4,+4), (-5,+5) day
return windows. CAR is each firm’s actual stock return over the event window, net of normal
return. Normal return is estimated for each firm based on the firm’s daily stock return in the
250 days window (-255,-6) prior to the event window, and the MSCI World Index converted to
NOK. Returns are calculated as the logarithm of the ratio of price on day t and price day t− 1;
prices are adjusted for splits/reverse splits and dividends. A stock needs 100 observations over
the estimation window to enter the CAR calculation. In the case of dual listings, I use the average
abnormal return over the listings for that firm. Few female directors is an indicator variable that
equals to 1 if the firm has below the median share of female directors in November 2005, else
zero. Board size is the total number of directors, including directors representing employees. The
market value equals the close price of the firm’s stock on the Oslo Stock Exchange on the last day
in the estimation window multiplied by the number of shares issued. In the case of dual listings I
use the aggregate market value over the listings of that firm. All regressions include indicator va-
riables for industry sectors. Robust standard errors (Huber/White/sandwich estimator) reported
in parenthesis; stars indicate significance levels: *** 1%, ** 5%, *10%.
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Table 4: Summary statistics, PLCs 1999-2008
Mean Std. Dev. Observations
Panel A: Listed PLC
Conversion decision 0.054 0.226 1727
Female directors 0.185 0.185 1751
Board size 6.256 1.819 1751
Equity ratio 0.441 0.238 1704
Firm age 23 27 1712
Return on assets -0.002 0.178 1684
Employee rep. 0.404 0.491 1751
Total assets (mill NOK) 12613 71058 1707
Market equity (mill NOK) 5734 26736 1631
Tobin Q 1.773 1.584 1597
Panel B: Non-listed PLC
Conversion decision 0.140 0.347 3278
Female directors 0.111 0.169 3376
Board size 4.691 1.705 3376
Equity ratio 0.475 0.396 3187
Firm age 11 19 3368
Return on assets -0.006 0.269 3082
Employee rep. 0.140 0.347 3376
Total assets (mill NOK) 4894 52020 3287
Notes: The table reports summary statistics for all PLCs over the period 1999 to 2008, separately
for listed and non-listed PLCs. The conversion variable is defined in Figure 2. Female directors
is the ratio of female directors representing owners relative to the total number of directors
representing owners. Board size is the total number of directors, including directors representing
employees. Equity ratio is equity divided by assets, both book values. Firm age is the current
year minus the year of incorporation. Return on assets is calculated as earnings before interest
and taxes divided by total book value of assets. The employee board representative indicator
variable equals to one if the firm has at least one director representing employees, else zero. Total
assets is the book value of assets. The market value of equity is the end of year close price of the
firm’s stock on the Oslo Stock Exchange multiplied by the number of shares issued. Tobin Q = (
Book value of total assets - book value of equity + market value of equity ) / Book value of total
assets. The following values are excluded as outliers: Absolute value of return on assets above
100%; Tobin Q value above 20; book value equal to or below zero; equity ratio below minus 100%.
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Table 7: Change in return on assets, 2004 - 2008
First stage 4 ROA
(1) (2) (3)
Dummy = 1 if firm did not comply with quota in 2004 0.264***
(0.028)
4 Female directors (predicted values) 0.054 -0.242
(0.191) (0.266)
4 Female directors (predicted values) × Information index 0.595*
(0.343)
Board size -0.006 -0.012 -0.010
(0.008) (0.011) (0.013)
Equity ratio -0.220*** 0.057 0.058
(0.077) (0.122) (0.133)
Firm age -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Employee rep. 0.029 -0.033 -0.053
(0.034) (0.042) (0.042)
Total assets, logarithm -0.038 0.042 0.050
(0.028) (0.036) (0.037)
Market value, logarithm 0.034 -0.035 -0.052
(0.029) (0.038) (0.040)
Tobin Q -0.002 0.010 0.017
(0.009) (0.016) (0.017)
Constant 0.300*** -0.123 0.315**
(0.099) (0.206) (0.150)
R2 0.587 0.082 0.148
Firms/Observations 101 97 88
Notes: The table reports estimates from regressing the change in return on assets (4ROA)
from 2004 to 2008 on the change in the share of female directors over the same period. Only
firms listed in both 2004 and 2008 are therefore included. Each column represents estimates
from a single regression. Variable definitions in Table 4. Column 1 reports the results from
the first stage, where I regress changes in the share of female directors on a dummy variable
that equals to 1 if the firm did not comply with the quota in 2004, and other variables. The
second stage (Column 2 and 3) uses the fitted changes in the share of female directors from
the first stage as an explanatory variable. The information index is defined in equation (1).
All regressions include indicator variables for industry sectors. Outlier values (as defined in
Table 4) are excluded. Robust standard errors (Huber/White/sandwich estimator) reported in
parenthesis; stars indicate significance levels: *** 1%, ** 5%, *10%.
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The disposition effect and momentum: Evidence from
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Abstract
Using a novel investor accounts dataset from Norway, I find that household inves-
tors are particularly likely to sell stocks when they experience a capital gain between
0% and 5%. The likelihood of a sale falls quickly both below and above this range;
big losses and big gains are equally unlikely to trigger a sale. Thus, the disposition
effect is driven by sales close to break-even, rather than a monotonically increasing
relation between current capital gain and the likelihood of a sale. I also find that this
household investor trading pattern contributes to momentum in small cap stocks.
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Why do investors trade? The standard economic model is concerned with asset prices,
with little or no regard to trading activity. Nevertheless, aggregate turnover on European
stock markets was 189% in 2007; a total volume of more than EUR 22 trillion.1 Investors
voluntarily pay financial intermediaries billions of Euro to facilitate trading volume of this
magnitude.
When investigating investor trading decisions there are good reasons to focus on hou-
sehold investors. First, household investors operate in a different regulatory environment
than other investors, and are less constrained to follow particular investment mandates.
Therefore, their trading decisions are likely to more directly reflect their personal prefe-
rences. Second, when tracking household investors over time we track the same individual.
When tracking the investment decisions of institutional investors, for instance a mutual
fund, the decision maker in the institution might change over time or there might be seve-
ral decision makers. The multitude of decision makers further complicates the link between
trading decisions and personal preferences, which is more clear for household investors.
In this paper I investigate how the capital gain that a household investor experiences
on a stock relates to sell decisions. This focus is motivated by research that documents a
so-called “disposition effect”: a tendency among household investors to realize gains more
readily than losses (Shefrin and Statman, 1985; Odean, 1998; Grinblatt and Keloharju,
2001). It is therefore often assumed that household investors exhibit a monotonically
increasing likelihood of selling a stock as their capital gain on the same stock increases; the
selling of stocks with big gains could be a rational response to avoid excessive concentration
in a portfolio (Odean, 1998; Grinblatt and Han, 2005; Frazzini, 2006; Campbell, 2006).
Using a novel investor accounts dataset from Norway, I therefore investigate whether this
assumed pattern in the relationship between sell decision and capital gain is borne out by
the data. The null hypothesis is that there is no pattern.
I find that household investors are particularly likely to sell stocks when they experience
a capital gain between 0% and 5%. The likelihood of a sale falls quickly both below and
above this range; big losses and big gains are equally unlikely to trigger a sale. Thus,
1Based on data from the Federation of European Securities Exchanges. The total value of equity
trading (volume) in 2007 on the 21 member exchanges was EUR 22,171,930 million, from a total market
capitalization of EUR 11,752,014 million.
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the disposition effect is driven by sales close to break-even, rather than a monotonically
increasing relation between the likelihood of a sale and current capital gain.
I then investigate the price impact of this capital gain induced pattern in the trading of
household investors. As household investors are particularly likely to liquidate stock close
to break-even, if the median household investor has a capital gain close to break-even that
would likely generate selling pressure from household investors as a group. If the median
household investor experiences a capital loss, then the majority of household investors
also experience a capital loss, and household investors as a group would be more likely
to hold on to the stocks that they own. This trading pattern, which is caused by capital
gains, could result in price continuation for the stocks where household investors represent
a relatively large share of ownership. For instance, as good news for a particular stock
arrives and other investors who trade on this news buy the stock, the price of the stock
increases. As the price then moves into the zone where household investors are induced to
realize gains, the resulting selling pressure might dampen the positive price reaction to the
good news. Thus, the household investor trading pattern established in this paper could
help explain the momentum effect in stock returns, which shows that past intermediate
horizon return is positively correlated with future intermediate horizon return (Jegadeesh
and Titman, 1993). Stocks with high returns over the past intermediate horizon are likely to
have triggered capital gain induced selling pressure from household investors. In that case,
as also argued by Grinblatt and Han (2005), the momentum strategy works because past
return proxy for the current capital gain experienced by investors who exhibit a disposition
effect. Therefore, past intermediate horizon return should not be related to future return
when properly controlling for the capital gain currently experienced by these investor.
I want to test the relative impact of momentum versus capital gain induced household
investor trading on future returns. I perform Fama and MacBeth (1973) regressions of
one week future return on past intermediate horizon return and measures of the current
capital gain experienced by the median household investor. I find that with the inclusion of
the household investor capital gain measures, past intermediate horizon returns no longer
predict future returns for small cap stocks. I do not find a similar relation in large cap
stocks, where household investors represent a relatively small share of stock ownership.
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Thus, cross sectional differences in the median household investor’s capital gain dominates
momentum in predicting cross sectional differences in future returns for small cap stocks.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 1 reviews the related literature; section 2
describes the data and offers summary statistics; section 3 reports on household investor
trading in relation to capital gain; section 4 relates household investor trading to momen-
tum; and section 5 concludes.
1 Related literature
1.1 Household investor trading
The literature is brimming with stylized facts on how household investors trade in stocks.
Incidentally, the majority of these findings point out choices that are hard to reconcile
with any standard model. For instance, household investors have poor diversification and
own relatively few individual stocks (Blume and Friend, 1975; Kelly, 1995; Polkovnichenko,
2005); have a preference for local or domestic securities (French and Poterba, 1991; Grin-
blatt and Keloharju, 2001; Seasholes and Zhu, 2010); have large holdings in the stock of
their employer and firms in sectors close to their employer (Benartzi, 2001; Doskeland and
Hvide, forthcoming); trade so intensively that it hurts their performance (Odean, 1999;
Barber and Odean, 2000); and buy attention-grabbing stocks (Barber and Odean, 2008).
These results apply to the average household investor and echo the pioneering study of
Schlarbaum, Lewellen and Lease (1978), who document that the majority of household
investor stock round trips (the gain from purchase to sale) do not beat investments in
Treasury bills with the same duration.2
Campbell (2006) offers two alternative interpretations of the investment mistakes made
by the average household investor. The first alternative is to concede that investors have
non-standard preferences, and express these preferences optimally. With this interpreta-
2In contrast, some specialized and sophisticated sub-groups of household investors exhibit relatively
better results in the stock market. For instance, some top performing active household investors consistently
get a better return than would be available from a passive investment in a marked index fund (Che, Norli
and Priestley, 2009); high income and well educated household investors have relatively better diversified
portfolios (Calvet, Campbell and Sodini, 2007, 2009a,b); and high IQ investors exhibit superior stock
picking skills (Grinblatt, Keloharju and Linnainmaa, 2010).
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tion, it is therefore useful to document which non-standard model of preferences has support
in the data. The second alternative is to consider instead the possibility that household
investors may not be able to express their preferences optimally, and that they can be
educated to make the choices that maximize household welfare, as prescribed by standard
economic theory. The latter interpretation therefore also demands an understanding of the
particular behavioral biases that generate these investment mistakes in order to more effec-
tively address these issues when educating investors. Either interpretation, then, demands
an investigation of the behavioral biases that account for these investment mistakes.
In this paper I focus on a particularly robust finding among household investors, the
so-called “disposition effect”. The disposition effect is the tendency among household
investors to realize gains more readily than losses (Shefrin and Statman, 1985; Odean,
1998; Grinblatt and Keloharju, 2001). This means that when a household investor sells a
stock, that stock is likely to have increased in price since purchase (a gain), whereas he is
likely to keep holding on to other stocks in his portfolio that have declined in price since
purchase (a loss). Selling gains can be a rational response to avoid excessive concentration
in a portfolio, but holding losses is hard to rationalize mainly because realizing these losses
would reduce the overall tax bill (Odean, 1998; Campbell, 2006).
What can explain this tendency to trade in relation to current capital gain? One possible
explanation is prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). According to prospect
theory, investors translate an asset’s state-dependent payoffs into gains and losses. The
outcomes are then valued with a value function that is concave for gains, convex for losses,
and steeper for losses than for gains. Investors that accord with this theory are therefore
risk seeking over losses, risk avers over gains, in addition to being loss averse (more sensitive
to losses than to gains). Barberis and Xiong (2009) show that a prospect theory investor
with rational beliefs exhibits a disposition effect if he cares differently about realized gains
and losses than paper gains and losses. For prospect theory to account for a disposition
effect in a multi-asset stock market, investors also need to regard each stock they buy as a
separate gamble. Thaler (1980, 1999) documents that participants in economic experiments
follow such “mental accounting” rules. Thus, investors motivated by prospect theory and
mental accounting would exhibit a disposition effect.3
3An alternative explanation for why household investors exhibit a disposition effect is that these investors
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Kyle, Ou-Yang and Xiong (2006) model the liquidation decision of a prospect theory
investor in more detail and show that such an investor will not only exhibit a disposition
effect, but also have a tendency to liquidate at break-even. The convexity in the investor’s
value function over losses tends to induce delayed liquidation when experiencing a loss,
whereas the loss aversion makes the investor more risk averse close to beak-even thereby
inducing liquidation near this point. This theoretical prediction of a tendency to liquidate
close to break-even seems to run counter to the standard interpretation of the disposition
effect, where researchers assume a monotonically increasing relation between the likelihood
of a sale and current capital gain (Odean, 1998; Grinblatt and Han, 2005; Frazzini, 2006;
Campbell, 2006).4 One reason why this interpretation has taken hold is because the stan-
dard way to measure the disposition effect only looks at days when a sell decision is made.
Moreover, the size of the gain or loss is not taken into account; all that matters in the
computation is whether the capital gain is positive or negative.
The exact relation between the sell decision of household investors and capital gain is
therefore an unanswered empirical question that demands high quality investor accounts
data. In this paper, I therefore investigate the relation between sell decisions and capital
gains using a novel dataset from the entire population of household investors at a national
exchange.
1.2 The price impact of household investor trading
To the extent that there are traces of particular behavioral biases in the trading of household
investors, a critical question is whether these biases are merely peculiar idiosyncrasies that
cancel each other out on average, or whether the biases have any impact on prices. We
know from Kyle (1985) that if a group of investors trade based on random demand shocks,
hold an irrational belief in mean reversion. Weber and Camerer (1998) find that participants in an economic
experiment with a hypothetical stock market at first exhibit a disposition effect. But when automatic
selling is introduced after each trade period, the participants did not systematically re-purchase losing
stocks, which they would have done with a strong belief in mean reversion. The disposition effect is
thereby greatly reduced. Therefore, a belief in mean reversion does not seem to account for the disposition
effect.
4This assumption seems confirmed by Seru, Shumway and Stoffman (2010) who document a positive
relation between capital gains and the likelihood of a sale among Finnish household investors. However,
Seru et al. (2010) only investigate highly active and sophisticated investors, 3.7% of the household investors
in their sample. Such investors are likely to differ markedly from the average household investor.
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then they will have no impact on prices. However, Barber, Odean and Zhu (2009) show
that the trades of household investors are highly correlated, and argue that behavioral
biases common to these investors act as coordination mechanisms. If household investors
are coordinated through exhibiting preferences consistent with prospect theory, what would
be the impact on the market?
Grinblatt and Han (2005) build an model where a rational investor with limits to
arbitrage and a biased investor with demand distortions from his current capital gain
interact in the market for a stock. They find that the influence of the biased investor
shows up as predictable stock-price continuation over the intermediate horizon. They then
test to see if this relation can help explain the momentum effect, which shows that past
intermediate horizon return is positively correlated with future intermediate horizon return
(Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993). They perform Fama and MacBeth (1973) regressions of
one week future return on past intermediate horizon return and a proxy for the average
unrealized capital gain (past market prices weighted by past turnover). They find that
with the inclusion of the capital gain proxy, the momentum effect largely disappears.
In this paper, I revisit the setup of Grinblatt and Han (2005) to test the relative impact
of momentum and capital gain induced household investor trading on future returns, but
with a direct measure of median household investor capital gains rather than a proxy.
2 Data and summary statistics
In this paper, I investigate household investor trading on the Oslo Stock Exchange (OSE)
from 2002 to 2007. OSE has been in operation for almost 200 years (established in 1819).
At the end of December 2007, OSE ranked 8th out of 21 European stock markets based
on market capitalization, 12th based on the number of listed firms, and 5th in terms of
turnover. Thus, OSE is a mature and liquid market, and therefore a useful laboratory to
study investor behavior. The appendix offers summary statistics from OSE for the years
2001 to 2008. Data from the OSE used in the analysis (prices, including split/reverse split
and dividend adjustments, volume, and indexes) are from the Stock Exchange database at
the Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration (NHH).
Investor accounts data are from Norwegian Central Securities Depository (“Verdipapir-
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sentralen”, VPS). I use the daily transactions on investor accounts in VPS from 2002 to
2007. For my purpose, it is important to note that VPS was introduced through legislation
in 1985 and is the only company with a license to run a securities depository for Norwegian
securities. Therefore, the aggregate holdings of OSE registered stocks in VPS investor ac-
counts is equivalent to the universe of stocks registered at the OSE. VPS thereby accounts
for who owns each of these stocks on any day. In addition, I have data on holdings as of the
last trading day in 2001. Finally, the data allows me to distinguish between different groups
of investors. Investors can be aggregated into the following categories: households, non-
profit institutions, general government, finance and insurance institutions, non-financial
corporations, and foreign investors. Thus, my dataset from Norway is comparable to that
from Finland introduced by Grinblatt and Keloharju (2000). Though the data covers all
investors on OSE, I focus on household investors in this paper. In the appendix I give an
overview of the Norwegian tax system for stock ownership. I show that realizing losses
will reduce the overall tax bill for Norwegian household investors throughout my sample
period, as it does for the US investors investigated by Odean (1998).
2.1 Summary statistics
Table 1 shows the ownership share of OSE market value by investor category. This is
based on the data file on holdings, which reports the number of stocks held in each investor
account in each stock at the end of 2001. Ownership shares are reported for all stocks,
and separately for large cap and small cap stocks. Small cap stocks are defined as firms
with a market value below the median valued firm on the exchange at the end of 2001;
the remaining stocks are classified as large cap stocks. Though small cap stocks thereby
make up half the number of stocks, they only represent 2.6% of OSE total market value.
We see that household investors exhibit a relatively small share of ownership in large cap
stocks, but a relatively large share of the ownership in small cap stocks. An artifact of
the Norwegian securities market is the large government ownership, at 37.8% of total OSE
market value. This is a result of relatively large holdings in a few large firms, rather
than a general governmental involvement, which is evident from government ownership
representing only 1% of the market value in small cap stocks.
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The dataset is obviously large with millions of observations, and I include two filters.
First, since I do not know the purchase prices for shares purchased before 2002, investor-
stock pairs in the holding file as of year-end 2001 are excluded from the analysis. Second,
I exclude stocks that experienced split/reverse split over the sample period.5 Although the
sample is reduced through these filters, it is difficult to find a reason why it should bias the
results in any particular direction. Also, pure day-traders are excluded from the analysis
by netting positions each day. If an investor first buys and then sells 100 shares in the same
firm during the same trading day, then his position change on that day is zero, and neither
of these transactions is therefore included. Each observation includes the date, volume
(positive if buy, and negative if sell), transaction price (from 2002 brokers were required to
include the transaction price when reporting to VPS), age and gender.
Table 2 offers summary statistics of the household investors in my dataset. Panel A
includes all investors in the holding file at the end of 2001. We see that the average portfolio
is worth NOK 128,157 (then equivalent to USD 14,000), and consists of 1.9 different stocks.
The average household investor is 51.7 years old; 33% are women. There are 380,833 unique
household investors in the holding file. In the analysis I use the transactions data from 2002
to 2007. In these data there are 477,588 unique household investors. Through the data
exclusion filters, the transactions data used in the analysis covers 170,225 unique household
investors, or 35.6%. Panel B reports summary statistics on these investors based on all
non-zero positions at the end of 2007. Compared to the investors in the holding file in
2001 the investors that enter the analysis have similar diversification (number of stocks)
and age. There are fewer women, 23% compared to 33%, and the average portfolio has a
higher nominal value (NOK 260,147, then equivalent to USD 48,000). Thus, the household
investors covered by the analysis are largely representative of the household investors that
operate on OSE. Their characteristics are also in line with those reported for the average
household investor in comparable studies (Che et al., 2009; Seru et al., 2010; Doskeland
5Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001) take account of pre-transaction data holdings by including transactions
in these investor-stock pairs only after such holdings are sold. However, this requires the use of two different
inventory principles: first-in-first-out (FIFO) until the pre-transaction data holdings are sold, and then
volume weighted basis thereafter. I choose instead to exclude these investor-stock pairs to consistently use
the volume weighted basis inventory principle. Stock split/reverse split are accounted for in the VPS data
with a delay. To avoid the dramatic capital gain effects that any inconsistencies that split/reverse split
would have on the results, stocks that experience split/reverse split over the sample period are excluded.
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and Hvide, forthcoming).
3 Household investor sales and capital gains
The traditional way to measure the disposition effect only looks at days when a sell decision
is made. Moreover, the size of the gain or loss is not taken into account: all that matters
is whether the capital gain experienced on the position is positive or negative. In the
appendix I confirm that the household investors in my sample exhibit a disposition effect
using the traditional method for measuring this effect. Instead of this traditional method,
I want to investigate the capital gain experienced every day from the time a household
investor buys a stock until the day he sells it. This enables me to determine whether any
particular capital gains tend to trigger sales for household investors.
First, I calculate the volume weighted basis on each position for each household investor
from the time he first enters a position until each sell decision. I use the actual purchase
prices to update the volume weighted basis. For instance, if an investor initially purchased
100 shares at price NOK 100, and then subsequently 200 shares at NOK 400, his total
holding is now 300 shares at a basis of NOK 300: (100× 100 + 200× 400)/300 = 300.
I then find the capital gain experienced every day over the full duration of the holding
period. I use the daily market close price to calculate the capital gain on days without
trade in an existing position. I use the actual sell price to calculate the capital gain at each
sell decision. Each observation is then either a sale (partial or complete liquidation of a
position), or a hold, and I know the capital gain on each of the observations.
Next, I group observations into capital gain intervals:
. . . , [−2,−1), [−1, 0), [0, 1), [1, 2), [2, 3), . . . .
All observations are then aggregated to find the estimated likelihood of a sale relative to
continued hold, given the interval of the concurrent capital gain from a% to b%, i.e.
p[a,b) =
Sales
Sales + Holds
∣∣∣∣∣[a, b)
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Figure 1 shows this estimated likelihood of a sale for capital gains between -50% and +50%.
We see that there is a jump in the likelihood of a sale from capital gains in the range [−1, 0)
to capital gains in the range [0, 1). The likelihood of a sale then increases slightly from
[0, 1) to [1, 2); falling thereafter, especially after [4, 5). These findings point to two relations
in the trading pattern of household investors. First, household investors are particularly
likely to sell stocks when experiencing a capital gain close to break-even, specifically in the
capital gain range [0, 5). Second, both big losses and big gains have a small likelihood of
triggering a sale.
On the first relation, I test the hypothesis that the likelihood of a sale in a particular
capital gain range [a, b), is equal to the likelihood of sale in the capital gain range [0, 1).
This means I am testing the following hypothesis
H0 : p[0,1) = p[a,b)
H1 : p[0,1) 6= p[a,b).
I perform this test for each of the capital gain ranges. Figure 2 gives the resulting Z-value
for each capital gain range, and details on the calculation of the test statistic.
As the number of observations is very large, small differences in these likelihoods could
be statistically significant at standard levels. I therefore set the level of significance for
these tests at the stricter level of 0.1%. My setup involves testing multiple comparisons,
and I need to adjust the significance level accordingly. There are 100 different groups (the
different capital gain ranges), which offers 100 × (100 − 1)/2 = 4, 950 possible pairwise
comparisons. Applying the Bonferroni adjustment on my two-sided test at 0.1% signifi-
cance, the level of significance that each of these hypothesis tests needs to pass is therefore
0.05%/4, 950 = 1/9, 900, 000. This gives a critical Z-value of ±5.2. From Figure 2, we see
that for all capital ranges below zero, the likelihood of a sale is significantly smaller than
that in [0, 1). Compared to [0, 1), the likelihood of a sale is significantly higher in both the
capital gain ranges [1, 2) and [2, 3). The likelihood of a sale in the capital gain ranges [3, 4)
and [4, 5) is not significantly different from that in [0, 1). All capital gains greater than 5%
are significantly less likely to trigger a sale compared to capital gains in the range [0, 1).
Thus, household investors are particularly likely to sell stocks when experiencing a capital
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gain close to break-even, specifically a capital gain between 0% and 5%.
To investigate the second relation, I test the hypothesis that the likelihood of a sale in
a capital gain range [a, b) above [0, 1) is equal to the corresponding capital gain range [c, d)
below [0, 1). For instance, I compare p[1,2) to p[−1,0), and p[2,3) to p[−2,−1), and so on. Figure
3 gives the results, and details regarding the calculation of the test statistic. We see that
household investors are more likely to sell stocks when they experience a capital gain close
to break-even then they are to sell at a comparable capital loss. However, as capital gains
increase in size, the likelihood of a sale decreases, and approaches the low probability of
a sale at correspondingly large capital losses. Thus, household investors are particularly
likely to sell stocks when experiencing a capital gain close to break-even, and big losses and
big gains are equally unlikely to trigger a sale.
Thus, the disposition effect is driven by sales close to break-even, rather than a mo-
notonically increasing relation between current capital gain and the likelihood of a sale.
The household investor trading pattern established in this paper is also consistent with the
theoretical prediction of liquidation decisions by an investor motivated by prospect theory
as shown by (Kyle et al., 2006).
4 Household investor trading and momentum
In this section I investigate the price impact of the household investor trading pattern
established in this paper. As household investors are particularly likely to liquidate stock
close to break-even, if the median household investor has a capital gain close to break-
even this would likely to induce a selling pressure from household investors as a group. If
the median household investor experiences a capital loss, then the majority of household
investors experience a capital loss, and household investors as a group would be more likely
to hold on to the stocks that they own. This trading pattern, which is caused by capital
gain, could result in price continuation in the stocks where household investors represent
a relatively large share of ownership. For instance, as good news for a particular stock
arrives and other investors who trade on this news buy the stock, the price of the stock
increases. As the price moves into the zone where household investors are induces to realize
gains, the resulting selling pressure might dampen the positive price reaction to the good
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news. Thus, the household trading pattern established in this paper could help explain
the momentum effect in stock returns, which shows that past intermediate horizon return
is positively correlated with future intermediate horizon return (Jegadeesh and Titman,
1993). In the appendix I verify that the returns to the momentum strategy on OSE over
my sample period are consistent with those reported from the US and elsewhere.
I want to test the relative impact of momentum and capital gain induced household
investor trading on future returns. I perform Fama and MacBeth (1973) regressions of
one week future return on past intermediate horizon return and measures of the current
capital gain experienced by the median household investor; controlling for short and long
term horizon returns, size and turnover. This setup is reminiscent of Grinblatt and Han
(2005) who instead use past prices weighted by past turnover as a proxy for average current
capital gain.
Thus, each week t I am interested in the following cross-sectional relationship, where I
have suppressed superscripts for stock j
rt,t+1 = α+β1rt−4:t+β2rt−52:t−4+β3rt−156:t−52+β4V¯t+β5st+β6gt+β7|g|t+β8
[
gt×|g|t
]
+t,t+1.
The one week future return of stock j, rjt:t+1, is the dependent variable. Similarly, past
cumulative returns from week t − t2 to week t − t1 are denoted by rjt−t2:t−t1 . Momentum
is captured by returns over the previous year excluding the past month rt−52:t−4, following
the documented effect in Jegadeesh and Titman (1993). In addition, I need a measure of
the capital gain on current holdings by household investors in each stock. I calculate this
measure by first finding the holding weighted median basis among household investors with
holdings in the stock as of week t; Bjt . This median basis is then held against the current
market price. Following Grinblatt and Han (2005), I lag the market price P jt one week
to avoid confounding market microstructure effects, such as bid-ask bounce. The current
capital gain at the end of week t is then
gjt = ln(P
j
t−1/B
j
t ) . (1)
To account for household investors’ propensity to liquidate around break-even, I also include
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the absolute value of current capital gain, |g|jt , in addition to an interaction term with
capital gain and absolute capital gain,
[
gjt × |g|jt
]
.
I also add controls for other variables known be to related to cross sectional differences in
future returns. I include controls for the short horizon (rt−4:t) and long horizon (rt−156:t−52)
past return patterns found in Jegadeesh (1990) and DeBondt and Thaler (1985), respec-
tively. As control for the return premium effect of firm size (Fama and French, 1993), I
include the regressor sjt , which is the logarithm of firm j’s market capitalization at the end
of week t. In addition, I control for possible return effects from differences in volume (Lee
and Swaminathan, 2000; Gervais, Kaniel and Mingelgrin, 2001) by including the regressor
V¯ jt =
1
52
51∑
i=0
number of shares tradedjt−i
total number of shares outstandingjt−i
, (2)
which is stock j’s average weekly turnover the 52 weeks prior to, and including, week t.
I have transaction data from 2002 to 2007, and I run regressions starting in 2003 to allow
a relevant basis to develop. I also perform separate regressions for weeks in the months
February to November. This is motivated by the seasonality in the momentum effect noted
in Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), the much stronger disposition effect in months other than
January (Odean, 1998), and that household investors engage in tax motivated trading in
December and January not seen in the rest of the year (Grinblatt and Keloharju, 2004).
Table 3 gives the results: Panel A covers small cap and Panel B large cap stocks. Small
cap stocks are defined as the firms with a market capitalization below the median valued
firm on the exchange each week; the remaining stocks are classified as large cap stocks.
In Panel A, when the household capital gain measures are excluded, we see evidence of
momentum in stock returns (positive β2). When I include the measures of household capital
gain β2 is no longer significant: The momentum effect largely disappears. The capital
gain of the median household investor is positively related to future returns (positive and
significant β6). This means that when the median household investor experiences a capital
gain, this is associated with positive future returns, whereas a capital loss is associated with
negative future returns. The absolute value of capital gain enters with a negative coefficient
(β7). Thus, although there is a positive relation between current household capital gains
and future stock returns, for capital gains this relationship is strongest near break-even.
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For capital losses this relation increases with the size of the loss.
The same pattern is not found in Panel B where I investigate large cap stocks. With
the inclusion of the household investor capital gains measures, β2, measuring the momen-
tum effect, is only marginally reduced. In addition, β6 and β7, which capture the impact
of household investors, are both small and insignificant. That household investors may
impact prices in small cap but not in large cap stocks is not surprising given that they
represent a relatively small share of ownership in large cap stock (see Table 1). Thus, cross
sectional differences in the median household investor’s capital gain dominates momentum
in predicting cross sectional differences in future returns for small cap stocks, but not for
large cap stocks.
5 Conclusion
I wish to suggest a causal relation from capital gain induced household investors trading
to momentum in stock return. By holding losing stocks and selling at a pre-determined
capital gain target (break-even), household investors contribute to prices reacting more
slowly to news; generating price continuation. Limits to arbitrage prevent rational investors
from immediately wiping out this pattern (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Liu and Longstaff,
2004; Grinblatt and Han, 2005), and the result is momentum in the stock returns of small
cap stocks where household investors represent a relatively large share of the ownership.
Thus, rather than random noise with no impact on prices (Kyle, 1985), household investors
constitute systematic noise contributing to the momentum effect in small cap stocks.
Fama and French (2008) find that momentum is a persistent phenomenon, not only
in small cap stocks but also in large cap stocks. If household investors generate momen-
tum in small cap stocks only, how can we explain momentum in large cap stocks? In a
complementary study, Lou (2009) finds that net capital flows to mutual funds, and the
corresponding scaling up or down of mutual fund holdings, explain momentum in large cap
stocks. Mutual funds often have investment mandates that preclude them from investing in
stocks other than large cap stocks. Thus, the investment decisions of household investors,
either directly through stock ownership or indirectly through mutual fund investments, are
intrinsically linked to the momentum effect.
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6 APPENDIX A: Tax system in Norway
In Odean (1998) the disposition effect is held against the fact that realizing losses would
reduce the investor’s overall tax-bill. How relevant is this normative ideal for Norwegian
household investors? There were two major tax reforms over my sample period (2002-
2007). A reform in 2004 affected company ownership of stocks, and a reform in 2006
affected individual ownership of stocks. Prior these reforms, all stock owners were taxed
under the same tax system. In this section, I first outline the basics of each of the three
tax systems, and then discuss the relevance of these tax considerations for my study. Much
of the following discussion is based on Brudvik (2005). I find that realizing losses would
reduce the overall tax bill for Norwegian household investors throughout my sample period,
as it does for the US investors investigated by Odean (1998).
6.1 Remuneration and RISK methods of 1992
In 1992, a new tax system for shareholders introduced the Remuneration and RISK methods
(“Godtgjorelsesmetoden” and “Regulering av inngangsverdien med skattelagt kapital”).
This system applied to all shareholders.
The Remuneration method meant that shareholders did not pay tax on dividends re-
ceived. Technically, this was accomplished in two steps. First, dividend was classified as
capital income and taxed at the flat rate 28% at the shareholder level. The shareholder
then received an identical tax deduction, which exactly off-set the tax on dividend received.
The RISK method was introduced to avoid double taxation on retained earnings (firm
profits not paid out as dividend). The rationale was that when a company retained ear-
nings, the added equity would lead to an increase in the share price. As the company had
already paid tax on the new capital, the shareholder’s capital gain should be adjusted for
the associated increase in the share price. Each year the firm calculated earnings net of
dividends and taxes to find the total RISK amount for that firm.
As long as the firm retained a share of earnings, the RISK amount that year would be
positive. A negative RISK amount would result if taxes and dividend were higher than
earnings, for instance if the firm paid out dividend out of retained earnings in previous
years. If the firm paid out all earnings as dividends each year the RISK amount would be
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zero.
Dividing the total RISK amount by the number of stocks in the company gave the RISK
amount per stock for that year. The person that owned a stock on the 31st December each
year accumulated these RISK amounts. When the owner sold a stock for which he had
accumulated RISK amounts, the sum of these RISK amounts was tax deductible. To
illustrate, let an investor buy a stock for 200 and sell at 100. Over the holding period the
investor has accumulated the RISK amount 10 for this stock. The investor’s capital gain
is 100− 200 = −100. His capital gain for tax purposes is 100− (200 + 10) = −110.
6.2 Exemption method of 2004
In 2004, the Exemption method (“Fritaksmetoden”) for taxation of company ownership of
stocks was introduced. Companies that own stock are now tax neutral. This means that
they receive dividends tax free, are no longer subject to tax on capital gains, and may no
longer deduct capital losses from taxable income.
In 2008 this new system for company shareholders was amended such that 3% of the
payments received (dividend and capital gains) is defined as taxable income. This new tax
was introduced to off-set the fact that companies can deduct from other taxable income
the costs associated with the tax-free income from stock ownership (though not the costs
directly associated with the actual buying and selling of stocks).
6.3 Shielding method of 2006
Since 2006, individual ownership of stocks has been taxed according to the Shielding me-
thod (“Skjermingsmetoden”). Individual investors now pay tax on dividend (they no longer
receive an identical tax deduction, as they did under the Remuneration method), and the
RISK method was stopped. Accumulated RISK amounts on stocks purchased before 1st Ja-
nuary 2006 are still deductible. After that date, an individual investor instead accumulates
a “risk free amount”, which is shielded from taxation. The risk free amount corresponds
to the return on a three month government bond, and is allocated to the person who owns
the stock on 31st December each year. This risk free amount is deducted from dividends
received, thereby reducing the tax payment. Any surplus risk free amount is then accu-
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mulated and can be used against dividend payments in later years, or to reduce the tax
bill from a capital gain at realization. The accumulated surplus risk free amount is each
year added to the purchase value of holdings in each stock to calculate that year’s risk free
amount for that stock.
If the person sells at a loss, he loses the accumulated surplus risk free amount. The
accumulated surplus risk free amount can only be used to reduce the capital gain to zero.
To illustrate, let an investor buy a stock for 200 before 1st January 2006, and sell at 100
after that date. Over the holding period the investor has accumulated RISK amounts of 10,
up to 1st January 2006. From that date and up to the day he sold the stock he accumulated
a surplus risk free amount of 10. The investor’s capital gain is 100 − 200 = −100. His
capital gain for tax purposes is 100 − (200 + 10) = −110. Since he sells at a loss he is
unable to use his accumulated surplus risk free amount.
6.4 Discussion
In my analysis, household investors use the volume weighted basis from the actual purchase
prices as their reference point to calculate capital gains and losses. This accords with the
regulatory treatment of capital gains, though additional tax credits are available through
the RISK method prior to 2006 and the Shielding method from 2006. Realizing losses
would reduce the overall tax bill of household investors under both of these tax systems.
The Exemption method, introduced for company shareholders in 2004, may have offered
an incentive for sophisticated household investors to organize their trading as a limited
liability company in order to avoid taxation. However, it is difficult to control for this
issue, other than by focusing on household investors, which I have done throughout my
analysis.
21
68
7 APPENDIX B: Summary statistics from OSE
Table 4 offers key figures on the Oslo Stock Exchange (OSE) for the years 2001 to 2008, one
year before the start and one year after the end of my investor accounts data. Following
a drop in the benchmark index value in 2001 and 2002, the index increases in value each
subsequent year up to 2007. At the end of 2007 the market value of all firms listed on the
exchange was NOK 2,157 billion (then equivalent to USD 400 billion). From the end of 2007
to the end of 2008, this market value was more than halved. The number of transactions
increased substantially over the period, whereas the number of firms listed at the end of
the year was fairly stable with an average of 212 firms.
22
69
8 APPENDIX C: The disposition effect
In this section I investigate whether the household investors in my dataset exhibit a dis-
postion effect similarly to that found in US household investors first reported by Odean
(1998); I follow his measurement procedure. This is important because the high probability
of selling around break-even goes against the generally held intuition that the disposition
effect is driven by a monotonically increasing relation between capital gains and the likeli-
hood of a sale (Odean, 1998; Campbell, 2006; Grinblatt and Han, 2005; Frazzini, 2006). If
the household investors in my sample do not also exhibit a disposition effect, the tendency
to liquidate around break-even could be an aspect of Norwegian household investors in my
sample, rather than a trait common to household investors.
I compare the aggregate proportion of losses realized (PLR) to the aggregate proportion
of gains realized (PGR).
PLR =
Realized losses
Realized losses + Paper losses
; PGR =
Realized gains
Realized gains + Paper gains
(3)
First, I determine whether the sale decisions are realized losses or gains. Then, for each of
these sale decisions, I classify the other stocks in the portfolio of that household investor
on that day as paper losses or paper gains. Table 5 shows that PGR is significantly greater
than PLR over the entire year, and in the months January through November, but much
less so in December. This is in line with the disposition effect reported in Odean (1998).
Thus, the Norwegian household investors in my dataset exhibit a disposition effect similar
to that reported for other datasets on household investor trading.
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9 APPENDIX D: Momentum strategy on OSE
This section investigates the returns to a momentum strategy on OSE. There is evidence of
persistent momentum returns in the US and in other developed countries around the world
(Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993; Rouwenhorst, 1998). However, it is important to verify that
the momentum strategy holds at the OSE for the sample period investigated in this paper.
I follow the “event time” procedure (Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993, p84), and I also adjust
the raw momentum returns for market and size risks (Rouwenhorst, 1998, p280). I find
that the pattern of momentum returns at the OSE over the sample period are consistent
with those reported by Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) and Rouwenhorst (1998).
Each month t from 1999 to 2008, I rank stocks based on their cumulative return for the
past 12 months. The 20% of stocks with the lowest cumulative past return is the “loser”
group; the top 20% is the “winner” group. I then calculate the equal weighted portfolio
return for each of these two groups in each of the subsequent 24 months. The return to the
momentum strategy, which buys the winner portfolio and sells the loser portfolio, is then
the return of the winner portfolio minus the return of the loser portfolio in each month.
These raw excess returns are then held against two common risk factors: a market
factor (Rm,t−Rf,t) and a size factor (SBt). See Table 6 for variable definitions. Thus, at k
months following each of the portfolio formation dates t over the sample period, I estimate
the regression
Wk,t − Lk,t = αk + βk[Rm,t −Rf,t] + γkSBt + k,t,
where Wk is the return to the winner portfolio k months after portfolio formation; Lk is the
return to the loser portfolio k months after portfolio formation. The risk adjusted trading
profits to the momentum strategy in the kth month after the portfolio formation is then
the resulting αk from this regression.
Table 6 reports the results: Column 2 the mean raw returns to the momentum strategy;
Column 4 the risk adjusted returns. We see positive and significant returns to the momen-
tum strategy up to about six months after portfolio formation, followed by a reversal in
returns from about 18 months after portfolio formation. The return to the momentum
strategy on the OSE over the sample period is thus largely in line with those reported
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by Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) for the US, and Rouwenhorst (1998) for several stock
markets around the world. Table 7 confirms that momentum returns persist at the OSE
when I exclude firms with a market cap below the 20th percentile or a share price below
NOK 10 (approx. USD 2).
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Figure 1: The likelihood of a sale relative to continued hold, given cur-
rent capital gain
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Notes: The figure plots the estimated likelihood of a sale relative to continued hold given the
current capital gain, aggregating over all stocks, all days and all household investors. First, I
calculate the volume weighted basis on each position for each household investor from the time
he first enters a position until each sell decision. I use the actual purchase prices to update the
volume weighted basis. I find the capital gain at each sell decision from the actual sell price, and
the capital gain on days without trade in an existing position from the daily market close price.
Each observation is then either a sale (partial or complete liquidation of a position), or a hold,
and I know the capital gain on each observation. All observations are grouped into capital gain
intervals:
. . . , [−2,−1), [−1, 0), [0, 1), [1, 2), [2, 3), . . . .
I then aggregate all observations to find the likelihood of a sale versus continued hold, given the
interval of the concurrent capital gain from a% to b%, i.e.
p[a,b) =
Sales
Sales + Holds
∣∣∣∣∣[a, b)
Pure day-traders are excluded from the analysis by netting positions each day. I exclude investor-
stock pairs for which I do not know the purchase price (holdings as of year-end 2001), and stocks
that experience split/reverse split over the sample period.
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Figure 2: Z-values from testing the difference in likelihood of a sale in
capital gain ranges [a,b) versus that in [0,1)
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Notes: The figure plots the Z-values from testing the difference in the estimated likelihood of
a sale in the capital gain range [a, b) versus that in [0, 1). Thus, I perform a standard Z-test
comparing the binomial probability of two groups. The test statistics is thereby
Z = (p[0,1) − p[a,b))
/√(
1
(Sales+Holds)[0,1)
+
1
Sales+Holds[a,b)
)
p(1− p) ,
where
p =
Sales[0,1) + Sales[a,b)
(Sales+Holds)[0,1) + (Sales+Holds)[a,b)
.
Under the null hypothesis, Z will be approximately standard normal. See Figure 1 for details on
the calculation of the likelihood of a sale in each capital gain range. Dashed horizontal lines give
the critical Z-value= ±5.197 for each test. This value follows from a Bonferroni adjustment of
a two-sided test with 0.1% level of significance for pairwise comparisons of 100 different groups.
100 groups offer 100 × (100 − 1)/2 = 4, 950 pairwise comparisons, and the level of significance
that each of these hypothesis tests need to pass is therefore 0.05%/4, 950 = 1/9, 900, 000.
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Figure 3: Z-values from testing the difference in likelihood of a sale in
capital gain range [a,b) above [0,1), and the corresponding capital gain
range [c,d) below [0,1)
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Notes: The figure plots the Z-values from testing the difference in the estimated likelihood of a
sale in capital gain range [a, b) above [0, 1) and the corresponding capital gain range [c, d) below
[0, 1). Thus, I perform a standard Z-test comparing the binomial probability of two groups. The
test statistic is thereby
Z = (p[a,b) − p[c,d))
/√(
1
(Sales+Holds)[a,b)
+
1
Sales+Holds[c,d)
)
p(1− p) ,
where
p =
Sales[a,b) + Sales[c,d)
(Sales+Holds)[a,b) + (Sales+Holds)[c,d)
.
For instance, I compare p[1,2) to p[−1,0), and p[2,3) to p[−2,−1), and so on. Under the null hypothesis,
Z will be approximately standard normal. See Figure 1 for details on the calculation of the
likelihood of a sale in each capital gain range, and the critical Z-value=±5.197, which is represented
by the dashed horizontal line in the figure.
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Table 1: Percentage ownership share of Oslo Stock Exchange by investor
category, December 2001
Investor category All stocks Large cap stocks Small cap stocks
Household 7.5 6.9 28.6
General government 37.8 38.8 1.1
Financial institution 11.3 11.2 14.2
Non-financial institution 15.2 14.5 43.3
Non-profit institution 0.3 0.3 0.4
Foreign institution 27.8 28.2 12.2
Unknown sector 0.1 0.1 0.3
Notes: The table reports the ownership share of Oslo Stocks Exchange market value by investor
category. Ownership shares are reported for all stocks, and separately for large cap and small cap
stocks. Small cap stocks are defined as the firms with a market value below the median valued
firm on the exchange at the end of 2001; the remaining firms are large cap stocks. The value of
each investor category’s holding is calculated by pricing the aggregate holding of each investor
category in each stock by the last available stock price quote in December 2001. Share of market
value for all stocks, large cap and small cap stocks, are then calculated from the aggregate value
of each investor category’s holdings relative to the total value. Small cap stocks make up 2.6% of
the total market value on the Oslo Stocks Exchange, but half the number of stocks.
29
76
Table 2: Summary statistics, household investors
Mean St.Dev. Median 5% 95% N
Panel A: All investors, 2001
Value of stock portfolio 128,157 9,395,832 13,775 165 305,503 380,833
Diversification (number of stocks) 1.9 2.3 1 1 5 380,833
Age 51.7 17.6 52 24 81 380,222
Gender (female = 1) 0.33 380,222
Panel B: All investors with known basis, 2007
Value of stock portfolio 260,147 2,511,794 42,500 1,140 843,750 108,719
Diversification (number of stocks) 2.0 2.2 1 1 6 108,719
Age 48.5 16.2 48 24 76 108,352
Gender (female = 1) 0.23 108,352
Notes: The table reports summary statistics of household investors. Panel A reports on all
household investors in the holding file at the end of 2001. Female is a dummy variable equal to
one if the investor is female, and equal to zero if male. Age is calculated as 2002 minus birth
year. Each investor’s holding in each stock is valued using the last available stock price quote in
December 2001. Panel B reports the same statistics using the investor accounts for which I am
able to calculate a basis, and which I use in the analysis. In the calculation of these summary
statistics, I include all non-zero holdings at the end of 2007, which is the end of my sample
period. Each investor’s holding in each stock is valued using the last available stock price quote
in December 2007. Age is calculated as 2008 minus birth year.
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Table 4: Key figures Oslo Stock Exchange, 2001 - 2008
Description 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Index 167 115 171 237 333 440 491 225
Index (%) -14.6 -31.1 48.4 38.4 40.5 32.4 11.5 -54.1
Market cap. 677 503 690 932 1403 1916 2157 999
Trading days 249 249 250 253 253 251 250 252
New Issues 28 6 7 9 28 57 54 13
Dividends 20 20 23 37 49 51 69 75
Transactions 2,529 2,048 2,348 3,406 5,480 8,846 12,138 16,850
Turnover 86.4 74.7 97.7 110.3 128.9 153.7 153.2 156.8
Companies 212 203 178 188 219 229 241 224
Listings 17 6 5 22 46 32 30 6
De-listings 19 15 30 12 15 22 18 23
Foreign comp. 26 24 20 22 28 33 31 41
Notes: Market index is the year-end Oslo Stock Exchange Benchmark index. Market capita-
lization, new issues, and total dividends are in billion Norwegian Kroner (NOK) at year-end.
Dividends includes only dividends paid by companies listed at the end of each year. Number
of transactions are in thousands. Turnover is the average of the annualized turnover per month
divided by the market value at the end of each month. Listings include de-mergers and de-listings
include merger. Source: OSE.
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Table 5: The disposition effect
Entire year December Jan - Nov
PLR .148 .165 .147
PGR .243 .226 .245
Difference -.095 -.061 -.098
t-statistic -27.05 -4.92 -26.76
Notes: The table compares the aggregate proportion of losses realized (PLR) to the aggregate
proportion of gains realized (PGR), defined in (3). First, I classify all the sale decisions in the
dataset as losses or gains. Then, for each of these sales, I determine if the other stocks in the
portfolio of that household investor on that day are paper losses or gains. Sales when there are
at least 2 stocks left in the portfolio after the sale are included. The table reports PLR and PGR
for the entire year, for December only, and January through November. The t-statistic tests the
null hypothesis that the difference in proportions are equal to zero assuming that all the realized
losses, paper losses, realized gains, and paper gains result from independent observations. Based
on a random sample of 10,000 sale observations over the sample period 2002 to 2007.
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Table 6: Momentum strategy, excess returns in event time
mean
k (Wk − Lk) t(mean) αk t(αk) βk t(βk) γk t(γk) R2
1 0.0339 4.66 0.0270 4.17 -0.35 -3.75 -0.94 -6.25 0.29
2 0.0373 4.91 0.0299 4.45 -0.37 -3.75 -1.00 -6.36 0.29
3 0.0327 4.67 0.0259 4.18 -0.24 -2.68 -0.94 -6.56 0.29
4 0.0296 4.42 0.0236 3.98 -0.22 -2.59 -0.90 -6.59 0.29
5 0.0243 3.62 0.0170 2.94 -0.27 -3.26 -0.93 -6.98 0.32
6 0.0200 2.83 0.0127 2.11 -0.25 -2.84 -0.97 -6.96 0.32
7 0.0181 2.54 0.0122 1.95 -0.24 -2.75 -0.87 -6.12 0.27
8 0.0162 2.33 0.0121 1.98 -0.27 -3.14 -0.80 -5.76 0.26
9 0.0097 1.52 0.0060 1.06 -0.20 -2.54 -0.73 -5.62 0.24
10 0.0069 1.08 0.0032 0.58 -0.24 -2.97 -0.78 -6.10 0.28
11 0.0063 0.96 0.0022 0.38 -0.26 -3.21 -0.82 -6.40 0.30
12 0.0041 0.65 -0.0003 -0.05 -0.18 -2.29 -0.80 -6.45 0.29
13 0.0019 0.32 -0.0024 -0.46 -0.13 -1.76 -0.67 -5.57 0.24
14 0.0038 0.60 0.0002 0.04 -0.11 -1.32 -0.69 -5.29 0.22
15 0.0042 0.68 0.0002 0.04 -0.11 -1.34 -0.70 -5.48 0.23
16 0.0025 0.39 -0.0005 -0.09 -0.10 -1.19 -0.62 -4.71 0.19
17 0.0030 0.50 0.0023 0.42 -0.05 -0.68 -0.50 -4.11 0.15
18 -0.0028 -0.45 -0.0052 -0.95 -0.06 -0.82 -0.62 -5.05 0.21
19 -0.0004 -0.07 -0.0000 -0.00 -0.07 -0.97 -0.41 -3.32 0.11
20 -0.0015 -0.24 -0.0009 -0.15 0.05 0.64 -0.37 -2.81 0.10
21 -0.0044 -0.72 -0.0024 -0.39 0.08 0.96 -0.19 -1.37 0.04
22 -0.0038 -0.59 -0.0026 -0.40 0.11 1.23 -0.15 -1.03 0.04
23 -0.0041 -0.62 -0.0019 -0.28 0.04 0.48 -0.15 -1.04 0.02
24 -0.0045 -0.74 -0.0025 -0.41 0.09 1.01 -0.09 -0.63 0.02
Notes: The table reports the returns to a momentum strategy on the Oslo Stock Exchange from
1999 to 2008. At each month t I rank stocks based on their cumulative return the past 12
months. Specifically, I use the log return from the ratio of the stock price at the end of month
t − 1 and month t − 12. Prices are adjusted for split/reverse split and dividends. Stocks that
do not have enough data for this calculation are excluded. The 20% of stocks with the lowest
cumulative past return is the “loser” group; the top 20% the “winner” group. This gives me
the loser and winner group at the end of month t. For each of the 24 months following t, I
then calculate the equal weighted portfolio return of each of these two groups. The return in
month k is the return on the winner portfolio net of the loser portfolio in the t + k month after
portfolio formation. Column 2 reports the mean return for this strategy. Column 4 reports the
risk adjusted mean return for this strategy. I adjust the momentum returns for two common
risk factors: the market factor (Rm,t − Rf,t), and a size factor (SBt). Rm is the log-return on
the Oslo Stock Exchange All Share Index (OSEAX) monthly close value. Rf is the one month
Norwegian Inter Bank Offered Rate (NIBOR); the rate used for the current month is the rate
quoted at the last day of the previous month. The size factor (SBt) is the value weighted return
on the portfolio of firms with a market value below the median-valued firm on the market, minus
the value weighted return on the portfolio of the remaining firms. Thus, I estimate the regression
Wk,t−Lk,t = αk +βk[Rm,t−Rf,t] +γkSBt + k,t , where Wk,t is the return to the winner portfolio
k months after portfolio formation at the end of month t; Lk,t is the return to the loser portfolio.
34
81
Table 7: Momentum strategy, excluding micro cap stocks
mean
k (Wk − Lk) t(mean) αk t(αk) βk t(βk) γk t(γk) R2
1 0.0242 3.61 0.0204 3.07 -0.21 -2.16 -0.50 -3.20 0.10
2 0.0250 3.83 0.0216 3.40 -0.29 -3.18 -0.51 -3.43 0.14
3 0.0183 2.99 0.0154 2.55 -0.11 -1.21 -0.46 -3.31 0.09
4 0.0180 3.00 0.0155 2.61 -0.15 -1.68 -0.44 -3.22 0.09
5 0.0150 2.32 0.0105 1.66 -0.22 -2.36 -0.56 -3.86 0.14
6 0.0124 1.84 0.0075 1.15 -0.09 -0.99 -0.63 -4.18 0.14
7 0.0120 1.82 0.0078 1.21 -0.07 -0.81 -0.56 -3.81 0.12
8 0.0095 1.40 0.0063 0.95 -0.09 -0.98 -0.51 -3.38 0.10
9 0.0094 1.57 0.0064 1.07 0.00 0.00 -0.47 -3.47 0.11
10 0.0061 1.07 0.0030 0.53 -0.05 -0.63 -0.48 -3.72 0.12
11 0.0025 0.43 -0.0005 -0.09 -0.03 -0.31 -0.45 -3.36 0.10
12 -0.0009 -0.15 -0.0023 -0.39 0.04 0.51 -0.26 -1.94 0.04
13 -0.0002 -0.04 -0.0025 -0.45 -0.01 -0.11 -0.30 -2.48 0.06
14 -0.0018 -0.32 -0.0027 -0.47 -0.01 -0.07 -0.29 -2.18 0.05
15 0.0051 0.88 0.0036 0.61 0.01 0.16 -0.27 -1.98 0.04
16 0.0003 0.05 -0.0016 -0.29 -0.02 -0.25 -0.38 -3.02 0.09
17 0.0007 0.14 0.0002 0.03 -0.03 -0.45 -0.33 -2.72 0.07
18 -0.0049 -0.89 -0.0051 -0.95 0.04 0.59 -0.31 -2.58 0.08
19 -0.0022 -0.41 -0.0004 -0.07 0.09 1.28 -0.19 -1.61 0.06
20 -0.0053 -0.89 -0.0036 -0.62 0.19 2.37 -0.16 -1.29 0.09
21 -0.0123 -2.05 -0.0104 -1.67 0.14 1.68 -0.07 -0.51 0.04
22 -0.0120 -1.89 -0.0093 -1.42 0.18 2.05 0.01 0.09 0.05
23 -0.0088 -1.29 -0.0051 -0.73 0.20 2.09 0.05 0.32 0.05
24 -0.0116 -1.83 -0.0084 -1.30 0.20 2.23 0.14 0.96 0.05
Notes: The table repeats the estimation of Table 6, but now firms with a market cap below the
20th percentile or a share price below 10 NOK (approx. 2 USD) are excluded from the calculation
of the momentum returns.
35
82
 83
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1708144
Eﬃciency, equality and reciprocity in social
preferences: A comparison of students and a
representative population
Alexander W. Cappelen Knut Nygaard Erik Ø. Sørensen
Bertil Tungodden∗
November 15, 2010
Abstract
The debate between Engelmann and Strobel (2004, 2006) and Fehr, Naef, and
Schmidt (2006) highlights the important question of the extent to which lab exper-
iments on student populations can serve to identify the motivational forces present
in society at large. We address this question by comparing the lab behavior of a
student group and a non-student group, where the non-student group on all observ-
able factors is almost identical to the representative adult population in Norway.
All participants take part in exactly the same lab experiment. Our study shows
that students may not be informative of the role of social preferences in the broader
population. We ﬁnd that the representative participants diﬀer fundamentally from
students both in their level of selﬁshness and in the relative importance assigned
to diﬀerent moral motives. It is also interesting to note that while we do not ﬁnd
any substantial gender diﬀerences among the students, males and females in the
representative group diﬀer fundamentally in their moral motivation.
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The relative importance of diﬀerent motivational forces has been a major issue in recent
research on social preferences (Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000; Andreoni and Miller, 2002;
Charness and Rabin, 2002; Engelmann and Strobel, 2004; Fisman, Kariv, and Markovits,
2007; Fehr et al., 2006; Cappelen, Drange Hole, Sørensen, and Tungodden, 2007), and
it has been argued that there may be important diﬀerences across subject pools and
economic environments. In particular, Fehr et al. (2006) report results suggesting that
the eﬃciency motive is especially salient among students of economics and business ad-
ministration, who have been trained in the idea that eﬃciency is desirable, whereas
equality appears to be of major importance for non-economists (ranging, in their study,
from students of various other disciplines to low-level employees of banks and ﬁnancial
institutions).1 On this basis, they argue that the prominence of the eﬃciency motive
in Engelmann and Strobel (2004), where all participants are students in economics and
business administration, is due to a subject pool eﬀect.
The debate between Engelmann and Strobel (2004, 2006) and Fehr et al. (2006)
highlights the important question of the extent to which lab experiments on student
populations can serve to identify the motivational forces present in society at large. We
address this question by providing a comparison of the lab behavior of a student group
and a non-student group. Our student group consists of second year students in economics
and business administration, whereas our non-student group is almost identical to the
adult population in Norway on observable factors. Both groups take part in exactly the
same lab experiment. To our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst study on social preferences
that attempts to bring a nationally representative adult population into the lab, and we
believe that such an endeavor is useful for gaining further understanding of the generality
of the ﬁndings of lab experiments done on student populations.2
As pointed out by Fehr et al. (2006), social preferences may diﬀer fundamentally
across economic environments. They argue that equality is even more important in
strategic games than in non-strategic games, but underline that better understanding of
the functioning of diﬀerent motivational forces in diﬀerent environments is needed. The
present study contributes to this by comparing the behavior of students and non-students
both in a dictator game (a non-strategic environment) and in a generalized trust game (a
strategic environment), where we focus on the relative importance of equality, eﬃciency
and reciprocity in motivating the participants’ behavior.3
Our study shows that the representative group diﬀers fundamentally from the students
both in their level of selﬁshness and in the relative importance assigned to diﬀerent moral
1See also Fisman, Kariv, and Markovits (2009) for a study of how training in economics may aﬀect
the concern for eﬃciency.
2A related interesting literature has looked at social preferences in non-student groups by conducting
survey-experiments (Fehr, Fischbacher, von Rosenbladt, Schupp, and Wagner, 2003; Bellemare, Kro¨ger,
and van Soest, 2008).
3Our experiment does not investigate the distinction between a concern for equality and a concern
for maximin, see Engelmann and Strobel (2004).
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motives. First, the representative group gives away 81.5% more than the student group in
the dictator game and returns 70.5% more in the trust game. Second, in the trust game,
we ﬁnd that the eﬃciency motive is stronger among representative males than among
students, whereas representative females do not assign importance to eﬃciency. Third,
only for representative males and students does the concern for equality expressed in the
dictator game carry over to the return decision in the trust game. Among representative
females, reciprocity concerns crowd out a concern for equality in a strategic environment.
The comparison of the student group and the representative group also illustrates
the potential danger of studying gender diﬀerences on the basis of a very selected group
such as students of economics and business administration. In our student group, males
and females appear to have the same moral motives, whereas the behavior of males and
females is fundamentally diﬀerent in the representative group.
It is interesting to compare our ﬁndings for the representative group to Alma˚s, Cap-
pelen, Sørensen, and Tungodden (2010), who report results from a social preference lab
experiment done on a group of children from 5th grade to 13th grade that is fairly rep-
resentative for these age groups in Norway.4 In particular, it is striking to observe that
the male-speciﬁc focus on eﬃciency among representative adults in the present study
maps closely to the the ﬁnding in Alma˚s et al. (2010) that a concern for eﬃciency mainly
develops among males throughout adolescence.5 This suggests that social preferences
established in childhood have long-lasting eﬀects on individual behavior.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 1 describes the sampling procedure; section
2 provides details on the experimental design; section 3 and section 4 report results from
the dictator game and the trust game, respectively; section 5 concludes.
1 Samples and participants
Of the 256 participants in our study, 120 were second year students at the Norwegian
School of Economics and Business Administration (NHH). The student group consisted
of about 60% males and 40% females, which is in line with the gender distribution in the
student population at NHH.
The remaining 136 participants were recruited from a representative sample of the
Norwegian population. Two criteria determined the selection of the non-student sample.
First, we wanted this sample to be representative of the Norwegian population with
respect to age, gender, employment and income. Second, as we wanted all participants in
our study to participate in a lab experiment at NHH, we considered it important that non-
4There is now a growing experimental literature on moral development in children, see among others
Krause, Harbaugh, and Berry (2001); Sutter and Kocher (2007); Fehr, Bernhard, and Rockenbach (2008);
Martinsson, Nordblom, Ru¨tzler, and Sutter (forthcoming).
5Martinsson et al. (forthcoming) report a similar ﬁnding in a study of social preferences among
children in Sweden and Austria.
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student participants did not have to travel too far. Based on data from Statistics Norway,
we established that the population living in the 27 basic statistical units closest to NHH
is representative for the population in Norway with respect to the selected dimensions.6
This region includes parts of the second largest city in Norway as well as less populated
rural farming areas.
Following the approval of the experiment by both the Norwegian Social Science Data
Services (“Norsk samfunnsvitenskaplig datatjeneste”) and the Norwegian Public Register
(“Norsk Folkeregister”), EDB Infobank drew a random subset of 1000 persons from our
representative population. We then randomly selected 460 individuals from this subset
to be invited to take part in the experiment. Each individual received a personal letter
inviting them to participate in a research project involving economic choices, but they
were not informed about the details or the purpose of the experiment. The letter also
gave the date and time of the session to which they had been assigned.7 The response
rate for the representative group was 30.2% and for the student group 28.6%.8
Table 1 reports the characteristics of the non-student group relative to the represen-
tative sample and the Norwegian population at large. The data for Norway and the
sample population were collected from Statistics Norway. The participants self-reported
age, gender, and employment, but not income.9 We collected the income data for the
participants from a publicly available tax return database. Since the participants were
anonymous in the experiment, we cannot link income data and experimental data at the
individual level.
We observe that the non-student group is fairly representative in terms of employment,
gender, income, and age, with females being slightly overrepresented. Hence, even though
the non-student group may not be fully representative relative to other characteristics,
we retain the label representative in describing these participants.
6A basic statistical unit is the smallest geographical unit used by Statistics Norway.
7In the invitation they were told that they would receive 300 NOK (45 USD) in participation compen-
sation for an experiment that would last for about one hour, and that they could earn more during the
experiment. The student subjects received a similar invitation by email and were told that they would
receive 100 NOK in participation compensation. The diﬀerence in participation compensation was based
on the additional travel time and cost that people in the representative population would incur relative
to the students in order to participate. Student sessions where held during the day, and representative
sessions in the evening.
810 of the invitations to the representative subset were returned to the research group because of
wrong address. The response rate was thus 136 out of 450. The total number of second year NHH
students was 420, of which 120 participated in our study.
9Two students did not report gender and thus are excluded from the analysis
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2 Design
All interaction between the participants was anonymous and through a web-interface
developed for the experiment.10 In the ﬁrst part of the experiment, the participants
played standard dictator games. Each participant was involved in four dictator games,
two as dictator and two as passive recipient, each time randomly paired with another
participant in the same session. The endowment e in each game was either 500 NOK
or 1000 NOK. The dictator was asked to choose an amount y for the other person and
(e − y) for himself. The choice set of the dictator was limited to amounts divisible by
25 NOK. The participants were not informed about the outcome in the situations where
they were recipients until the end of the experiment.
In the second part of the experiment, the participants completed ten trust games, ﬁve
as sender and ﬁve as responder, each time randomly paired with another participant in
the same session. In each trust game, both the sender and the responder were allocated
an endowment ei ∈ {100, 200, 300}, for i = 1, 2, where the sum of the endowments for
each pair of players was always 400 NOK. In addition, there was a multiplier of m1 on
the sent amount and a multiplier m2 on the returned amount, where mi ∈ {1, 2, 4}, for
i = 1, 2, and the product of the two multipliers in each situation was 4.
All participants ﬁrst completed their decisions as senders. In each situation, before
they made a decision, they were informed about the vector (e1, e2,m1,m2), and the sender
then decided whether to send an amount y1 ≤ e1 of the endowment to the responder. The
responder would then receive y2 = m1y1. After completing all ﬁve sender decisions, each
participant was presented with an overview of their choices and given the opportunity
to revise each of them. All participants then completed their decisions as responders.
In each situation, the responder was informed about the vector (e1, e2,m1,m2, y1, y2),
and the responder then decided the amount y3 ≤ e2 + y2 to return to the sender. The
sender received y4 = m2y3. When the responders had completed their decisions in all
the ﬁve situations, they were presented with an overview of their choices and given the
opportunity to revise each of them. The total payoﬀ for the sender (π1) and the responder
(π2) in a particular game is given by:
π1 = e1 − y1 +m2y3 = e1 − y1 + y4,
π2 = e2 +m1y1 − y3 = e2 + y2 − y3.
The choice set of both players was limited to amounts divisible by 25 NOK.
At the end of the experiment, for each person and with equal probability, one of the
games in which the participant had been involved was randomly drawn to determine
actual payment. The ﬁnal payment procedure ensured that neither the participants nor
10Instructions were given in Norwegian. See the appendix for an English translation of the instructions.
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the research team were in a position to identify how much each participant earned in the
experiment.
3 The dictator game
The distributive situation in the dictator game has three important characteristics that
limit the possible motives the dictator may have for sharing. First, the other participant
is unable to respond to the decision made by the dictator, which implies that sharing
cannot be motivated by self-interest. Second, the total income is ﬁxed, which implies
that sharing cannot be motivated by eﬃciency concerns. Third, the dictator does not
respond to a decision made by the other participant, which implies that sharing cannot
be motivated by reciprocal concerns.
We interpret the amount given as a measure of the extent to which a concern for
equality motivates the dictator to act non-selﬁshly. Figure 1 provides a histogram of
the share given for both subject groups by gender, the average share given is reported in
Table 2. We observe that there are large diﬀerences between students and representatives.
Whereas the mode among students is to take everything for themselves, the mode among
representatives is to share equally. On average, representative males give away twice as
much as student males (40.3 % versus 19.8 %), and representative females give away 55
% more than student females (41.7 % versus 26.9 %).11 Table 3 shows that the diﬀerence
between students and representatives is substantial and statistically signiﬁcant also when
controlling for age and employment (p < 0.001).12 In sum, the dictator game provides
clear evidence of the strong motivational force of equality in our non-student group, and
shows that the great importance of equality may be underestimated if we solely focus on
a subject group of students of economics and business administration.
4 The trust game
We now turn to a study of the behavior in the trust game, where the participants poten-
tially may be motivated by eﬃciency, equality and reciprocity considerations.
Figure 2 and Figure 3 provide histograms for share sent and returned for both subject
groups by gender, the average shares are reported in Table 2. We observe that share
sent is almost the same for the representative group and the student group (51.7% ver-
11There is no statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerence in share given for 500 NOK and 1000 NOK; 23.6%
versus 21.9% for students (p=0.143), 41.1% versus 41.3% for representatives (p=0.868).
12We observe from Table 2 that the diﬀerence in average share given between males and females is
not statistically signiﬁcant for representatives (p = 0.608), whereas for students it is (p = 0.035). If
we consider the share of situations where the dictator takes everything there is a statistically signiﬁcant
diﬀerence between males and females among students (36.4% versus 17.7%, p=0.013), but not among
representatives (5.0% versus 3.0%, p=0.517).
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sus 54.2%), but with some gender diﬀerences. Almost half of the student males send
everything (43.7%) and, overall, they send more than representative males, whereas rep-
resentative females send less than student females. In both cases, however, we observe
large standard errors and the diﬀerences between students and representatives are not
statistically signiﬁcant (p = 0.16 for males and p = 0.14 for females, correcting for clus-
tering on individuals). In the return decision, students, both males and females, return
less than the representatives, with an overall diﬀerence of 70.5% (17.6% versus 30.0%).
We observe that the share of students returning nothing is more than twice the share of
representatives acting in a completely selﬁsh way.
We here focus on the return decision, which provides the most direct test of how
the participants trade oﬀ selﬁshness and diﬀerent moral motivations in a strategic envi-
ronment. The eﬃciency motive comes into play through the multiplier on the returned
amount, which varies from 1 to 4. When the multiplier is 1, there is no eﬃciency argu-
ment for returning anything, whereas a multiplier of 2 or 4 provides a strong eﬃciency
argument for returning everything. The reciprocity motive comes into play because the
responder may want to reward participants who have sent a large share of the endow-
ment. Both these motives, however, may interact with the concern for equality in the
return decision; the equality motive may dampen the willingness to act on the eﬃciency
motive, and it may generate reciprocal behavior independent of the reciprocity motive.
To capture the extent to which a concern for equality motivates the return decision,
we calculate the amount, ytarget3 , that each participant has to return to achieve the distri-
bution he or she selected as dictator.13 We do so by ﬁrst solving the following equation
for y∗3,
π1
π1 + π2
=
(e1 − y1 +m2y∗3)
(e1 − y1 +m2y∗3) + (e2 +m1y1 − y∗3)
= sdictator,
where sdictator is the share given to the other person in the dictator game.14 The return
amount has to be non-negative, and thus we deﬁne,
ytarget3 = max(0, y
∗
3). (1)
In the following, we use ytarget3 to control for the importance of the equality motive in the
return decision.
Table 4 reports regressions of share returned by gender on the three other-regarding
motives, where we control for age and employment. We observe some striking diﬀerences
between males and females in the representative group. Representative males assign
great importance to eﬃciency concerns, the point estimate of the multiplier is 9.2% and
13A similar approach is used in Ashraf, Bohnet, and Piankov (2006).
14In calculating sdictator, we take, for each participant, the average share given away in the dictator
game.
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thus the estimated diﬀerence in share returned between situations with a multiplier of
1 and 4 is 27.6%, whereas the share returned among representative females is not at all
sensitive to the multiplier. Representative females exhibit a strong reciprocal motivation
in the return decision, but not a concern for equality as expressed in the non-strategic
environment. In contrast, the reciprocal motive does not seem to have any force among
representative males, who also in the strategic environment assign importance to equality
considerations.
A very diﬀerent picture emerges for the student group. First, students assign far less
importance to eﬃciency than representative males, but much more importance to equality
than female representatives. Second, the reciprocity motive has some motivational force
among the students, but is less prominent than among female representatives. Third,
there are no statistically signiﬁcant gender diﬀerences in the student group, which is in
stark contrast to what we ﬁnd in the representative group. In sum, the trust game shows
that the social preferences of representatives and students group are very diﬀerent.
5 Conclusion
Our study demonstrates clearly that, as suggested by Fehr et al. (2006), student subject
groups may not be representative of the social preferences in society at large. They
diﬀer fundamentally from a representative group of non-students both in their level of
selﬁshness and in the relative importance assigned to diﬀerent moral motives. Moreover,
we show that while there are no signiﬁcant gender diﬀerences in the student group, males
and females in the representative group diﬀer fundamentally in their moral motivation.
We ﬁnd that both equality and eﬃciency are important motivational forces among
representative males, whereas representative females seem to move from a concern for
equality in non-strategic environments to a focus on reciprocity in economic environments.
The fact that all three motives play a role in explaining lab behavior of a group that
is fairly representative for the Norwegian population, suggests that these motives are
important also when analyzing economic and social phenomena in society at large.
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Figure 1: Histogram of share given in the dictator game
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Notes: The ﬁgure reports, for each subgroup, the distribution of the share given in the dictator
game. Each participant acts as the dictator in two dictator game situations, and each dictator
game situation enters here as an independent observation.
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Figure 2: Histogram of share sent in the trust game
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Notes: The ﬁgure reports, for each subgroup, the distribution of the share sent in the trust
game. Each participant acts as the sender in ﬁve trust game situations, and each trust game
situation enters here as an independent observation.
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Figure 3: Histogram of share returned in the trust game
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Notes: The ﬁgure reports, for each subgroup, the distribution of the share returned in the trust
game. Each participant acts as the responder in ﬁve trust game situations, and each trust game
situation enters here as an independent observation.
13
96
Table 1: Age, gender, employment and income distributions for the non-
student group, the sample population, and the Norwegian population
Non-student group Sample Norway
population
A. Age
17-30 25.6 26.8 25.5
31-40 14.3 23.7 22.3
41-50 30.1 19.2 20.6
51-60 16.5 16.5 19.1
61-70 13.5 13.8 12.5
B. Gender
Male 38.6 48.4 49.6
Female 61.4 51.6 50.4
C. Employment
Private sector 55.6 58.1 63.8
Public sector 44.4 41.9 36.2
D. Income
0-99,999 20.9 23.5 24.7
100,000-199,999 24.8 25.7 29.8
200,000-299,999 27.1 24.2 24.8
300,000-399,999 15.5 11.6 10.7
400,000-499,999 6.2 5.8 4.1
500,000 and over 5.4 9.3 5.8
Notes: Non-student group: Age, gender, and employment are self-reported by the partici-
pants in the experiment. Income is taxable income in NOK, including labor income and capital
gains over the year, net of all deductables including interest payments; collected from publicly
available tax return database (Year: 2005). Sample population and Norway: Age and gen-
der are collected from Statistics Norway (Year: 2006). Employment is collected from Statistics
Norway (Year: 2001). Income is collected from Statistics Norway (Year: 2004).
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Table 2: Share given in the dictator game, share sent and share returned
in the trust game
Student Representative
Male Female All Male Female All
A. Share given, dictator game
Mean 0.198 0.269 0.227 0.403 0.417 0.412
(0.023) (0.024) (0.017) (0.024) (0.012) (0.012)
B. Share sent, trust game
Mean 0.620 0.429 0.542 0.542 0.502 0.517
(0.040) (0.041) (0.031) (0.038) (0.027) (0.022)
C. Share returned, trust game
Mean 0.186 0.161 0.176 0.365 0.259 0.300
(0.021) (0.016) (0.014) (0.037) (0.016) (0.018)
n 70 48 118 52 84 136
Notes: The table reports, for each subgroup, the average share given in the dictator game,
average share sent in the trust game, and average share returned in the trust game (n is the
number of individuals in each subgroup). Each individual acts as dictator in two dictator games,
as sender in ﬁve trust games, and as responder in ﬁve trust games. Standard errors corrected
for clustering on individuals in parentheses.
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Table 3: Regressions of share given in the dictator game
Student Representative
Male Female Male Female All
Above 30 years old 0.049 0.042 0.043
(0.053) (0.036) (0.030)
Working, public sector 0.028 -0.022 -0.008
(0.086) (0.037) (0.036)
Working, private sector -0.015 -0.007 -0.014
(0.077) (0.034) (0.036)
Female 0.011
(0.028)
Student -0.182
(0.048)
Female x student 0.061
(0.044)
Constant 0.198 0.269 0.367 0.395 0.380
(0.023) (0.024) (0.077) (0.036) (0.042)
Observations 140 96 99 159 494
R2 0.021 0.020 0.231
Notes: The table reports results from OLS regressions of the share given in the dictator game.
All students are coded as not working and as below 30 years old. The dummy variable “above
30 years old” is equal to one if the dictator in the situation is above 30 years old, otherwise zero.
There are two dummies for working status, one for the public and one for private sector. The
excluded working status category is “not working”. Standard errors corrected for clustering on
individuals reported in parentheses.
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Table 4: Regressions of share returned in the trust game
Student Representative
Male Female Male Female All
Share sent 0.095 0.059 -0.088 0.150 0.058
(0.036) (0.030) (0.064) (0.057) (0.023)
Share returned target 0.659 0.522 0.713 0.122 0.511
(0.101) (0.110) (0.149) (0.138) (0.072)
Multiplier return 0.023 0.011 0.092 0.007 0.034
(0.010) (0.011) (0.020) (0.014) (0.007)
Above 30 years old 0.145 0.035 0.073
(0.095) (0.033) (0.039)
Working, public sector -0.061 -0.008 -0.032
(0.102) (0.036) (0.044)
Working, private sector -0.139 0.009 -0.051
(0.100) (0.038) (0.047)
Female -0.117
(0.038)
Student -0.109
(0.059)
Female x student 0.077
(0.044)
Constant 0.031 0.047 0.038 0.110 0.145
(0.028) (0.025) (0.102) (0.061) (0.056)
Observations 350 240 250 395 1235
R2 0.180 0.229 0.268 0.098 0.230
Notes: The table reports the results from OLS regressions of the share returned in the trust
game. Share returned target is deﬁned by (1). The multiplier varies from 1 to 4. For the re-
maining variable deﬁnitions, see Table 3. Standard errors corrected for clustering on individuals
reported in parentheses.
17
100
 101
